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The majority of the court in the case just mentioned,* reversed the lower court for granting an injunction but justified the
reversal on several grounds not available to justify the decision
in the Woods case. First, it appeared that the farm had been so
badly damaged before the injunction was asked for, that the
court thought it would not pay to leave a lot of good coal in the
pillars and ribs to avoid the further damage that would result
from its removal. A strange reason, says some reader. In
Long v. Brougher, 5 Watts 439, Chief Justice Gibson observed
that "in the pursuit of reparation for a trespass to my person, I
am not to be told that my battered carcass was of little worth to
me by reason of a previous beating. * * * In that predicament
the condition of the sufferer is an aggravation of the wrong,
inasmuch as the residue of a man's soundness, whether of body
or character, is the more valuable to him, because it is all that
he had to depend upon. It would be no extenuation of the putting
out of an eye that the other had been put out before." Berkey had
a fine dairy farm before the mining destroyed his ten or eleven
springs. When the injunction was sought he could' still get
some water but not enough to be worth saving, thought the court.
Berkey had a much weaker case than Woods for two other reasons. (1) Berkey owned the surface only-Woods owned a valuable four foot vein of coal overlying the vein in which the supports were being removed. (2) Berkey owned the coal under his
buildings and the coal company averred in their answer that they
*Berkey v. Coal Mining Co., 220 Pa. 65.
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were not going to steal it. Woods had made no such reservation
to protect himself. These differences in the cases were doubtless what gave hope to Woods and his counsel, notwithstanding
the defeat of Berkey.
In the Berkey case, Justice Elkin, speaking for the majority,
had declared: "If the threatened injury is of an irreparable
character which could not be compensated in damages by an
action at law; or if buildings or other permanent improvements
would be endangered; or if overlying strata of coal, or other mineral estate, would be seriously disturbed or displaced, by the mining of all the coal, it is clear equity would in proper case intervene to restrain such acts, even before the injury had been done."
(Instead of "even before" one would have expected to find him
saying "provided that the injury has not yet been done.")
The decision of the Berkey case, reversing the lower court
for granting an injunction, was an authority upon which the
court would have based its refusal of relief to Woods, one might
have supposed. The decision is not mentioned, though it was
but three years old and though it contained an extended review
of the authorities by two judges. We are led to wonder
whether the presence in the Woods case of the very facts that
we had been assured in the Berkey case would justify equitable
relief, led the court to pass by the Berkey case without a reference to it.
In addition to the Berkey case, the court passed without
reference, four other injunction decisions in cases of this class;
Lawrence, Merkel & Co.'s Ap. 2 W. N. C. 4 and 78 Pa. 365; Nelson v. Hoch, 14 Phila. 655, 36 Leg. Int. 215; de Saulles v.
Percy Mining Co., 16 D. R. 684 and Miles v. Penna. Coal Co.
214 Pa. 544. In the first case the P. & R. R. R. Co. secured a
perpetual injunction restraining mining under the Mahanoy
Plane. In the second of these the court declined to dissolve an
injunction restraining the removal of the coal beneath the plaintiff's lots, though the plaintiffs had full notice of the fact of mining under or near their lots when they purchased them and
erected houses. The court went so far as to say that a surface
owner has a right to erect his house upon the very outcrop of
the coal and demand that he be protected from any disturbance
in the secure enjoyment of his house. True, the case was a
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strong one, for the plaintiffs alleged that their very lives were in
jeopardy, but the decision is based upon the emphatic declarations of our Supreme Court as to the absolute character of the
obligation resting on the mine operator to support the surface.
The opinion states :---"In Coagon v. Sheafer et al. (a case almost similar to the present one), where this court restrained the
defendants from fhining and removing coal beneath the lot of
the complainant, the Supreme Court sustained the injunction."
(See also Hecksher v. Sheafer, 10 Sadler, 222.)
In de Saulles v. Percy Mining Co., 16 D. R. 684, a surface
owner sought an injunction, to restrain the removal of the ribs
and pillars of coal without replacing them with other substances.
This decision is thus aptly described by Justice Mestrezat in
Berkey's case, 220 Pa. at p. 81: "The question raised there is
the identical question raised in this case. and the learned judge
of that court after a very full and careful consideration of the
question, citing numerous decisions and text book authority in
support of his conclusion, awarded an injunction restraining
the owner of the coal from mining it without leaving proper
support for the surface. The opinion in that case simply reflects the understanding of the profession in the bituminous
coal region on the right of the surface owner to invoke the aid
of a chancellor to compel the owner of the coal to furnish absolute support for the surface."
Judge Umbel wrote the opinion and well expressed the question involved in these cases as follows: "If the plaintiffs
elect to have their surface maintained in its natural condition
rather than have it disturbed and be paid damages for the injury done, do they have the right to choose accordingly and require the defendant to leave sufficient coal standing to support
the surface or provide otherwise for the permanent support
thereof?" He thought he had found the answer in such declarations of the Supreme Court as this one in Pringle v. Coal Co.,
172 Pa. 438: "In that (Jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429) and other
cases following in its wake, it has been uniformly held that where
there has been a separation of the coal from the surface, the owner of the latter, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, has
an absolute right to have his surface support precisely as it was
in its natural state." Like emphatic statements he found in All-
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house's Estate, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 146; Coal Co. v. Fuel Gas Co.,
131 Pa. 522; Robertson v. River Coal Co., 172 Pa. 566, and Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa. 81. To these the writer would add
this quotation from Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. at p. 482,
"Where there has been a horizontal division of the land, the
owner of the subjacent estate, coal or other mineral, owes to
the superincumbent owner, a right of support. This is an absolute right arising out of the ownership of the surface. Good or
bad mining in no way effects the responsibility; what the surface owner has a right to demand is, sufficient support, even,
if to that end, it be necessary to leave every pound of coal untouched under his land. Berwind v. Barnes, 13 W. N. C. 541;
also the English case, Harris v. Ryding, 5 M. & W. 60, in which
Baron Parke uses this language: 'I do not mean to say that
all the coal does not belong to the defendants, but they cannot
get it without leaving sufficient support. We have followed
rigidly this rule, as thus tersely suggested, in all our decisions on
the subject, and they have been many. Of course, defendant
has a right to all the coal under this lot, but, he had no right to
take any of it, if thereby, necessarily, the surface caved in. The
measure of his enjoyment of his right must be determined by the measure of his absolute duty to the owner of the surface.'"
Judge Umbel answered his question, in the light of these
statements, as follows: "If the owner of the overlying strata
or surface elect that it shall be maintained in tact, he has the
right to do so; and upon his so electing, we are of opinion that
he is entitled to an injunction restraining such removal, at least
until the parties attempting to remove arrange, either by filling
the space occasioned by such removal with other substances, or
otherwise, to support and preserve permanently the natural condition of the surface or overlying strata."
He then points out that to withhold the injunction would be
to enable every surface owner to be readily circumvented by the
coal companies. "Suppose we owned," says he, "a valuable farm
underlaid with this vein of coal, and in consequence of its being
an old homestead and the associations connected therewith, or
for any other reason, we are anxious to maintain it in tact, and
for no amount of money would we agree to have the coal mined
and the surface disturbed, the injury would be 'of a character
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not susceptible of measurement or estimation in damages.'" He
then supposes that the situation is explained to some one seeking to buy the coal and that the buyer has made ready answer
that unless the right to surface support is expressly waived, he
would have to leave sufficient coal to support the surface. "We
would close the deal and then, because in its opinion it (the coal
company) could make more money out of the coal it would have
to leave to support the surface than a jury would assess against
it as the damages it would be required to pay, it would proceed
to disregard its promise and the aforesaid decisions and take
out all of the coal and practically destroy, not only the money
value of our farm, but the sentiment and association, which have
no money value and could not possibly be paid for in dollars."
As to the "balance of convenience" doctrine, largely relied
on by the Supreme Court in the Berkey case, he quotes this forcible statement from Walters v. McElroy, 151 Pa. 549: "As
to the principles invoked, that the chancellor will refuse to enjoin when greater injury will result from granting than from refusing an injunction, it is enough to observe that it has no application where the act complained of is in itself as well as in
its incidents, tortious. In such cases it cannot be said that injury would result from an injunction, for no man can complain
that he is injured by being prevented from doing to the hurt of
another that which he has no right to do. Nor can it make the
slightest difference that the plaintiff's property is of insignificant value to him as compared with the advantages that would
accrue to the defendant from its occupation."
In Sullivan v. Steel Co., 208 Pe. 540, a nuisance case, Justice Brown said: "There can be no balancing of conveniences
when the preservation of an established right is involved,
though possessed by a peasant only to a cottage as his home. * * *
There is no authority for the idea that equity may refuse to protect a man in the possession and enjoyment of his property because that right is less valuable to him than the power to destroy
it is to his neighbor or the public." * * * "The phrase 'of grace' had
its origin in the age of kings and it has no rightful place in the jurisprudence of a.free commonwealth."
In the appeal of the Pennsylvania Lead Co., 96 Pa. 116, the
Supreme Court declared: "Where justice is properly adminis-
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tered, rights are never administered by their mere money value,
neither are wrongs tolerated because it is to the advantage of the
powerful to impose upon the weak. Whether it be the great corporation with its lead works, or the mechanic with his tin shop,
the rule is the same. * * * There is no good reason why the
rules of law should be relaxed in one case rather than the other."
What intelligent laymen, unsophisticated by experience with
the courts, after listening to these declarations from our Supreme
Court, as the ready lawyer of the coal company reads them to
him, would hesitate longer about selling his coal? He would
be apt to remark: "My father was one of many who long opposed the creation in Pennsylvania of courts of equity, so called,
fearing their arbitrary power but I see his fear was without foundation. I will sell the coal and trust to the courts that express
these lofty sentiments that you have read to me."
Let me call the man in question Woods or Berkey and see
how his confidence in the courts is justified. Berkey originally
owned his farm in fee. When he sold his coal, he granted also a
right of way over the surface but he was careful not to waive the
right to gurface support. He did not expressly stipulate in the
deed that the surface should be supported, for he was doubtless
assured that the Supreme Court had decided over and over again
that he could-lose-this-right only by express grant. At first the
coal company regards its duty to leave pillars and ribs standing.
But later it decides to remove the coalin them also. What is the
result? The ten or eleven springs of water on the farm cease flowing. Cracks 6pen in the surface from 100 to 300 feet long and as
wide as four inches. The surface sinks in patches of all sizes
and shapes. These are the facts as found by Judge Kooser in
Berkey's case. (See 220 Pa. at p. 68.) He seeks an injunction.
The coal companies, lessor and lesseemake no denial of the facts
but the lessor company alleges that its royalties on the coal in
the pillars will amount to $18,000. The lessee claims that, if not
stopped,it can pay the royalties and still have a profit of $18,000
for itself. The Court below decrees that the coal may all be removed but that the coal companies should furnish some other substantial supports for the surface. Because he added this condition, his decree was reversed by the Supreme Court.
The opinion of the Court first states the right of the plain-
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tiff to be beyond all question. "Of course, if the injury complained of is irreparable so that it cannot be adequately compensated in damages, or if the act intended to be committed is in
the nature of a trespass, or tort, or if the wrong sought to be redressed amounts to a nuisance, which by reason of the persistency with which it is repeated, threatens to become permanent,
courts of equity will interfere by injunction to prevent such
wrongs: (citing case.s). The present case does not come within the reason or spirit of the rule announced in these cases."
"Why not?" the reader may ask. First, says the court, the injury can be adequately compensated in damages. Second, "the
mining and removing of coal by the party who owns it and
has the right to remove it, and whose operations are conducted
by the most approved methods known in mining operations, cannot
be said to be a trespass, or tort or nuisance, within the meaning
of the rule of the above cited cases, in which equitable relief has
been granted. In the above cases the respondents were trespassers witlout any right of property in the thing injured, while in
the present case appellants are the owners or lessees of coal with
the right to remove it."
For the present we will postpond consideration of the adequacy of the damages allowed in these cases. Let us look at
the second reason first. To deliberately remove the ribs afid
pillars of coal and make no pretence of providing substitutes
and this after the surface has begun to show serious damage,
(thousands of dollars the court found) is no tort! But the
most approved mining methods were being used, says the court.
This is a revival of a suggestion that had been repudiated as
entirely irrelevant in a long line of cases. They had all been
collected and quoted from at length as recently as Coal Co. v.
Bank, in 211 Pa. 319. Of what interest is it to the surface
owner that the coal operator knows how to get out the last pound
of coal without getting caught in his own trap? As was said
in Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. at p. 482: "So, there is nothing
gained by adducing evidence of good or bad mining, or by a
discussion of that subject."
The Supreme Court seems to have taken judicial" notice of
the superiority of the methods used by the Berwind White Company, for the facts as found simply state that it had "extensive
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improvements, machinery, appliances and equipment for mining
coal."
But a trespasser is without any right of property "in the
thing injured," "while in the present case the appellants are the
owners or lessees of the coal !" Just as if ownership of the coal
gave the mine operators an interest in the land of their neighbor
above them. My neighbors on the surface owe me the duty of
lateral support. Our lots touch each other just as the tenement
of the coal owner touches the tenement of the owner of the superincumbent strata, but we venture to doubt whether this is enough
to justify us in asserting that I have an interest in my neighbor's
lot above me on the hillside. It was long ago determined by
the Supreme Court that an injunction is the appropriate remedy
to put a stop to the quarrying of stone in an open quarry, if
thereby one's neighbor's lot is caused to slide into the excavation. Weir & Bell's Appeal, 81Y2 Pa. 203. See also Ganby v.
Kirst, 7 Lack. L. N. 172.
Lest the reader remain unconvinced that an injunction
should not be granted in favor of a surface owner against a
coal company, the court next invokes the doctrine "of the balancing of equities or of comparative values." "It must be conceded, that this doctrine has not been favored in our state, although it is recognized in other jurisdictions and supported by
text-writers very generally." Then, as if to harmonize the law
of Pennsylvania with the views of text writers, he declares:
"The decree of a chancellor is of grace not of right, and he is not
bound to make a decree which will do more mischief and work
greater injury than the wrong which he is asked to redress:
Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286

* * *

A Chancellor will

consider whether he would not do greater injury by enjoining
than would result from refusing and leaving the party to his
redress at the hands of a court and jury: Richard's Appeal,
57 Pa. 105; Huckenstein's Appeal, 70 Pa. 102. The present case
certainly comes within the spirit, if not within the express language, of the rule laid down in the cases just cited."
The- cases just cited were nuisance cases like the Sullivan
case in 208 Pa. in which this doctrine was so eloquently repudiated as unworthy to have a place in the jurisprudence of a free
commonwealth. Thus the uninitiated Berkey discovers that
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there are authorities looking both ways and that he is a rash
man who will predict which lot of cases the Supreme Court will
invoke. The latest one will control? Oh no! The old ones
are just as good.
Further, we are told, the plaintiff's bill lacks equity. "By
his express covenant the mining company is given the right to
mine and remove all the coal, so that when in the prosecution of
its mining operations it undertakes to mine and remove the entire stratum it is only doing what the appellee in the express
language of his covenant said could be done. A rule of law, as
old as the commonwealth, comes to his aid by charging upon
the underlying mineral estate the servitude of surface support,
in the absence of the waiver of this right in the grant. The
law has thus done for him what he has not done for himself." One
might have supposed that the law is as free to the poor surface
owner as it is to the coal company. But no, the surface owner
should express the rule of law in his deed; he should exact a
covenant from the coal company to obey the law, for, though he
may still get damages if he fails to do so, he will lack equity if he
does not and the chancellor will turn a deaf ear.
It is to be noted that Justice Mestrezat filed a vigorous dissenting opinion in this Berkey case. "I think it clear," said he,
"the uncontroverted facts show that such damages would be
an entirely inadequate compensation for the injuries which are a
necessary consequence of failing to properly support the surface. The removal of the coal being without the shadow of
authority and ,an invasion of the conceded legal rights of the
surface owner, it is in the face of all our decisions on the subject to say that a chancellor has no jurisdiction to entertain a
bill to preserve the integrity of the plaintiff's surface."
After being turned out of equity, Berkey seeks the law
courts. The jury agreed he had been badly treated and gave
him $5,000 damages. This time the judgment in his favor was
not reversed. See Berkey v. Coal Co. 229 Pa. 417. Justice
Mestrezat writes the opinion and likely he had not forgotten the
earlier case.
Let us now examine the assertion made in the Woods case
and in the Berkey case that damages are an adequate remedy
for the surface owner. We will not ask the reader to suppose
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that the surface owner has any sentiment about his home. Let
us look at the matter as a plain business proposition. Does our
Supreme Court permit the surface owner to collect his actual
money loss? How must the damages be estimated, when they
can be recovered?
In Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, the lower court charged
the jury to estimate the "difference between the fair market
value of the property before the accident (the subsidence of the
house and lot) and what it was worth after the accident as affected by the accident." How soon after the accident? The
owner may be forced to move elsewhere at once. May he sell
at once and collect his loss? No, said the court, not till "after
the excitement incident to the accident has subsided, after the
community has ceased to have any fear arising from the subsidence. That was the time at which the market value should
determine and fix the value of the property, not when the community was excited and disturbed and frightened and away from
their homes, but after everything had quieted down, what was
then the market value of this property?" In short, all losses
suffered by the surface owner who can't afford to wait till "everything has quieted down," are his for all time. He who waits and
gets the fair market price may recover his loss. Did the Supreme
Court accept this? No. On p. 487, justice Dean says: "If
plaintiffs be entitled to recover, their measure of damages is the
actual loss they have sustained to their land, including the building thereon, by reason of the 'cave-in.' The difference in the
market value before and after the injury in this class of cases is not
the true rule; in this case, under the evidence, perhaps it worked
no injustice, but in many cases it would do so." Injustice to
whom? To the surface owner? Yes. To permit a coal company to deliberately withdraw all support from under a man's
home without giving any security to answer for the consequences
of the act and, after the house has collapsed on his family, to
permit him to recover no more than must be paid when land is
taken under the right of eminent domain, does seem a little
hard on the surface owner.
But no, it was not the surface owner the court had in mind.
It was thinking of some cheaper measure of damages for the
coal companies. In the next case that arose, Rabe v. Shoen-
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berger Coal Co., 213 Pa. 252, the lower court read to the jury the
very words of the Supreme Court in Noonan v. Pardee. For
doing so he was reversed and the measure of damages repudiated
in Noonan v. Pardee was held to really be the correct measure after all, in those cases in which the injury is permanent, e. g. when
the depressions render the property less available for certain
purpose§, as when the destruction of springs render it impracticable to continue a .dairy. The lower court had permitted testimony as to the value of each spring destroyed and the cost of repairing the buildings. But it was held on appeal that this
method (if calculating the damage might result in a larger verdict than would a consideration of the value of the whole property before and after the injury. Whenever the diminution in
market value would be less expensive for the coal company than
the cost of repairs, then the repairs are deemed "unreasonable"
and the one injured must be content with the same measure of
damages allowed to corporations to whom the legislature has
We had been informed
granted the power of eminent domain.
in Pringle v. Coal Co., 172 Pa. 438, that the surface owner's right
is to have his land remain "precisely as it was," but we now
learn that the surface owner can only get the cost of restoration
when this is cheaper for the coal company. He may be driven
out of business as was Weaver in the case of Weaver v. Berwind
White Coal, Co., 216 Pa. 195. Weaver and Rabe both had
dairies and doubtless each had a business that it had taken years
to develop. Prior to the injury, Weaver raised a large number
of horses and cattle. This source of revenue was ended. Was
he compensated for these losses? Here is the language of the
Court on appeal :--"The rule is settled that the measure of damages for permanent and irremedial injuries to land caused by
failure to give surface support, is the actual loss in depreciation
of the value thereof. * * * If the injury is reparable the cost of
repairing may be recovered, and if the cost of repairingis greater
than the diminution in the market value, the latter is the true measure of damages." True, Weaver still owned the farm but its
utility was destroyed and his living gone. He knows dairying
and stock raising. He is driven to sell out for what he can get
and move on. A corporation without any pretence of right has
taken from him the very things that made his property valuable
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to him. None of the safeguards that protect the land owner
when his land is taken by legislative eminent domain are available. He may get damages estimated by the same rule, but he
has absolutely no means of preventing his eviction, for our
Supreme Court assures him that damages are an entirely adequate remedy.
This Weaver case is interesting for another reason. The
coal company called experts to testify that the springs would
have been destroyed by the mining, even had the surface been
supported. The court held that no damages could be recovered
for their destruction unless the jury were convinced that it was
the collapse of the surface that destroyed them. It was said:
"In support of this contention the rule of law is invoked, that
injury to or destruction of surface water, or springs, by reason
of the mining of coals, or other minerals, either from adjoining
lands or from underneaththe surface of the particularland, when the
mining is done in a competent and workmanlike manner is
damnum absque injuria." This doctrine seems to be repudiated
by justice Mestrezat in Berkey's second case, 229 Pa. at p. 429.
He would confine the doctrine to the unaviodable destruction of
springs by persons owning land laterally adjacent. The third
paragraph of the syllabus is this: "The principle that the
owner of land has the right to mine and remove his coal without liability for injuries done subterranean streams of water
flowing to neighboring land has no application to the right of the
owner of the surface against the owner of the coal there-under
to recover damages for injuries to the surface by mine operations." This seems to be the gist of an extended statement
upon the point, but it is in direct conflict with the expressions
of the court in the Weaver case.
The Berkey case made another change in the law. Like
the one just mentioned it is favorable to the surface owner. It
is this. It had been held in the Weaver case four years before,
that the surface owner could only collect the cost of repairs when
they are less than the "diminuition in the market value." In
the Berkey case the lower court charged the jury thus -"If
the injury can be repaired with a reasonable effort and expense
less than the value of the property (you couldn't carry the exp nse
for repairs beyond the value of the whole), then the measure of
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damages is not the difference in value of the farm, but it is what
it would cost to make the repairs." As to this Justice Mestrezat
said: "The twelfth assignment relates to the measure of damages. The learned judge correctly disposed of the matter covered by this assignment. He distinctly told the jury that if the
injury was reparable or curable with reasonable effort and expense less than the valve of the property, the measure of damages
was what it would cost to make the repairs."
It is obvious that the rule of the Weaver case is very different from the rule of the Berkey case. The Coal Company
may not be made to pay the cost of repairs if such cost would
exceed the "value of the property." Value when? Before or
after the repairs are made? Is the idea that considerations of
public policy (the conservation of the national wealth), forbid
the expenditure of money to repair wrongs in case the property
would not sell after repairs for what had been spent for repairs?
Or is the idea that no property should have spent on it a sum in
excess of the value it had before the expenditure? If the latter
is the idea then the coal company that does great damage to a
house may be better off than the one that does much less damage. The more complete the destruction, the less the value before reparation and the lower the limit placed upon the damage
recoverable. In all cases in which the property is worth more
after the injury than the amount of the depreciation caused by
the injury, Justice Mestrezat's rule as to the limit recoverable
for repairs, is more favorable to the surface owner than is the
rule of the Weaver case. Obviously also, the rule is still more
favorable to the surface owner if the limit of expenditure is the
value of the property after it has been restored. But does even
this last rule give such an adequate measure of damages as to
justify the refusal of specific relief by a court of equity? If a
man's house is his own, "his castle," as we are told, why shouldn't
he recover from the man who wrongfully overturns it exactly
what it costs to set it up again? How does it lie in the mouth
of a wrongdoer to say that the house is in bad taste and would
not have a ready sale, or that it is old fashioned or located in a
neighborhood where such a house is out of place, and that the
owner could not sell it, if it is restored, for what it will cost to
restore it? Is it not enough that the house suits the owner, that
he likes the old fashioned best, and that he prefers to stay where
he was born rather than take some money and hunt a new home
in a strange neighborhood? What standing has a wrongdoer
to tell me that to repair such a house is "unreasonable?"
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If then the most favorable construction of the most favorable utterance of the most favorable judge, expresses a rule that
in many cases will fall short of enabling the owner to be placed
in statu suo and since no rule suggests any allowance for the
multitude of incidental and consequential losses that accompany
this wrong, is it any wonder that the judges decline to enter
upon a consideration of the truth of their repeated assertion
that damages are an adequate and complete remedy for this tort?
Perhaps the reader is asking "Did the lower court invent the
rule approved in the Berkey case?" No. It is a familiar rule
in other cases of damage to property. In Gift v. Reading, 3
Super. Ct. 359, where property was injured by the negligent
construction of a sewer, Judge Smith said: "The measure of
compensation would be the cost of repairing the damages and
thus restoring the property to its former condition, unless such
cost would equal or exceed the value of the building, in which case
the value of the building would be the measure of the plaintiff's
damages." In Lucot v. Rodgers, 159 Pa. 58, a case of the subsidence of a wall and house due to negligence, the lower court
charged the jury: "But that wall may have cost more than the
lot was worth, and therefore the cost of it is not what he is
entitled to receive, but what it was worth in that place. It may
be after the wall was built the whole lot would not be worth as
much as the wall cost; that is very possible." The idea seems
to be that no more money should be recovered for rebuilding
the wall than the wall would add value to the property. If
this is not enough, the property owner must make up the difference or do without a retaining wall. The Supreme Court described the charge as full and accurate. Again in Eshleman v.
Martic Twp., 152 Pa. 68, Justice McCullom said: "In the recent
case of Robb v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. 324 and Lentz v. Carnegie,
Ibid., 612, this subject was fully considered, and it was held
that the true measure of damages in a case like the present, is
the cost of remedying the injury unless that equals or exceeds the
value of the thing injured, when such value becomes the measure."
This rule was again followed in Stevenson v. Coal Co., 210 Pa.
112, a case in which the damage was due to deposits of coal dirt
on the land, and in Harvey v. Coal Co., 201 Pa. 63, where the
property was injured by the escape of coal dust from a breaker.
It thus appears that though Justice Mestrezat laid down this
rule as applying to cases of surface support for the first time in
the Berkey case, in 229 Pa. 417, apd though he did not allude to
the different rule laid down in the Rabe and Weaver cases, he
had abundant precedent for the rule as given by him and we
may have some hope that the next case will not overturn it.
(Concluded in June Number)
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This letter was written in acknowledgment of copies of the Dickinson Law Review, containing an article on Refreshing Recollection.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL
Northwestern University Building
Chicago
John H. Wigmore
April 13, '13.
Dear Professor Trickett:
I thank you for the articles in the Law Review, and enjoyed reading
your careful analysis of the Pennsylvania cases, as I do everything you
write. I wish that the same care could be spent in straightening out the
law of every State. It is just what we need.
In the new edition of my Cases on Evidence I have taken the liberty
of using a few passages from former articles of yours, the Character
articles and the Reasonable Doubt articles. The subtle satire of the last
I used with especial relish.
Why can not the Illinois Law Review exchange with the Dickinson
Law Review? I shall speak to our editor-in-chief,
And is there no way in which our library can acquire a set, complete
or partial of the back volumes of the Dickinson Law Review? Please
refer this to its business manager.
With appreciation of your courtesy, I am,
Yours very truly,
JOHN H. WIGMORE
I want to add that the opinions in the Dickinson Moot Court are as
good as anything in any Supreme Court.

MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH v. HADLEY
Negotiable

Instrumenit-Forgery-Materiaty of Alteration-Alteration
of Figures
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant Hadley was given a check which read as follows:
Carlisle, Pa., Jan. 1, 1913.
No. 2
FARMERS TRUST COMPANY
Pay to the Order of Jonah Hadley .............................
Three and ..................................................

$*379oo
9loo dollars
THOMAS ALLEN

With intent to defraud, Hadley inserted the figure "9" before the
figure "3" (as indicated supra*).
Bender for Commonwealth.
Levin for Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
DAVIS, J. The question in this case is whether or not the inserting
of the figure "9" before the figure "3" in the margin, without making
any change in the body of the instrument, constitutes forgery.
Forgery is the false making of an instrument which purports, on the
face of it, to be good and valid for the purposes for which it was created,
with a design to defraud any person or persons, (Am. Eng. Ency. of
Law). Then in Trickett's Criminal Law, Vol. 1, page 131, we also find
it defined as the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the
prejudice of another man's rights.
It is clearly stated in the facts that the defendant had the intent to
defraud. In 13 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law 1085, it is stated that it is
not necessary to show an intent to defraud a particular person or persons, a general intent being sufficient. As the offense consists in the
mere intention, it is not necessary that any one should have been actually
injured or defrauded by the writing. It is enough that it may probably
or even possibly be done. The offense of forgery is complete, tho there
be no publication or uttering of the forged instrument. The very making,
with a fraudulent intention and without lawful authority, is of itself a
sufficient completion of the offense.
Believing that we have made it sufficiently clear that it is not necessary to utter or publish the writing, and that the. mere intent is all that
is required, we will now proceed to consider the alteration that was made
on this check. In the case before us the alteration was made in the
marginal figures, the body of the instrument remaining unchanged.
In a very important sense the figures in a promissory note, bill of
exchange, or check, are part of it. They serve to avoid mistakes in the
body of the instrument. Whilst it is true and has generally been held,
that where there is a variance between the amount written in the body
of the instrument and the amount noted in the figures, the written part,
in the absence of fraud, will fix the liability of the party, nevertheless
the amount in figures, if varying from the amount written in the body
of the instrument, serves to put the takers on inquiry. Since figures in
the margin serve for this purpose, it is reasonable to say that there was
a probability or possibility of some one being defrauded by the alteration
made by the defendant.
Com. v. Pioso, 17 Super. 45. The defendant had written at the
corner of a blank check "55," when A instructed him to fill it out. He
put a "3" before the "55," and also wrote in the words "three hundred
and fifty-five." This was held to be forgery. The defendant maintained
that the figures were not a material part of the note, but the court held
that if the- note was filled up contrary to the meaning and intention of
the parties, and the figures were changed by addition of the figure "3,"
the defendant was guilty, 'because in law the altering of the figures and
the filling of the note for a larger sum constituted the crime of forgery.
We conclude from this that the figures are a material part of a check,
because it plainly provided for the altering of the figures.
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Reg. v. Bail, 7 Ont. Rep. 228. The alteration, of a $2 Dominion note
to one of the denomination of $20, by the addition of a cipher after the
figure "2" wherever the figure occurred in the margin of the note and
by pasting a piece of paper over the "0" in the word "two" in the margin, was held to be forgery.
Haynes v. State, 15 Ohio 455. Cutting out the words "one dollar"
from the body of a note, adjusting blank paper in the space so made,
and substituting the figure "5" for the figure "1" where it appeared in
the margin, with the intent to defraud, was held to be forgery.
In 94 Kentucky 517, we have a case directly in point. A check for
seventy cents, the amount of which was also in figures, thus $79oo near
the top of the check, was altered by inserting the figure "3" between
the dollar mark and the fraction 7900, leaving the words seventy cents
in the body of the check unchanged. It was held that this was forgery,
altho the person to whom the check was presented for payment could,
by close observation, have detected the forgery and prevented the consummation of the fraud. Further, that it is not necessary that the whole
instrument should be made false or fictitious. In 64 Ga. 448, a like conclusion was reached by the court upon a similar case.
We believe that the facts in the case before us are sufficient to constitute the crime of forgery, and if they are not, then there would be a
too convenient loop-hole for the escape of the guilty and result frequently
in the failure of justice. We therefore hold the defendant guilty.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The authorities are in accord in declaring that in order that an alteration may constitute forgery, it must be material. 19 Cyc. 1375.
There is not, however, such a unanimity in defining what alterations are material. In S. v..Lotona, 62 W. Va. 310, 58 S. E. 621, it is
said, "An alteration in an instrument, to amount to forgery, must be
such as to make it speak a language different in legal effect from that
which it originally spoke, or which carries with it some changes in the
rights, interests or obligations of the parties to the writing. It follows
that an immaterial change--a change which if true would not affect the
legal liability of the parties in an action on the instrument-would not
amount to forgery. The -test is the legal effect of the change or alteration,
not whether some person may be. deceived or misled by the paper."
Applying this rule it was held in the same case that the fraudulent
alteration of the figures in a check did not constitute forgery. The
court said, "Was the alteration of the figures in the check a material
one? We think not. It is true the figures follow the words in the body
of the check denoting the sum called for, as is frequently the case,. and
are not strictly marginal; but we do not think they form a material part
of the paper. They are for ready reference, as if written at the top or
in the margin, and for convenience, they are not controlling and do not
change the legal effect of the paper. The words are the controlling portion, and the figures constitute no material part of the instrument."
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The doctrine, that where the amount for which a check is drawn is
stated in words and also -in figures, the alteration of the figures does not
constitute forgery, is asserted and applied in S. v. Means, 47 La. Ann.
1535, 18 So. 514; Welson v. S. 85, Miss. 687, 38 So. 46, and P. v. Lewinger,
252 Ill. 332, 96 N. E. 837. In the last case the court said that, both under
the common law and the negotiable instrument act, "the figures are not
strictly a part of the contract. They can not be reverted to to impeach
the amount named in the body of the paper, and are never resorted to
for any purpose unless there is uncertainty in regard to the amount written in the body of the instrument."
The doctrine of these cases is consistent with, and fortified by the
holdings of the courts in civil cases, that unless an alteration changes
the legal effect of the instrument, i. e., makes it express a contract different from that which was entered into by the parties thereto, the alteration is not material and that therefore a change in the figures in a bill
or note, where the amount is also expressed in words does not constitute
a material alteration. 2 Cyc. 196, 211, 3 Ency. L. and P. 392, 397, Horton v. Horton, 71 La. 448, Smith v. Smith, 1 R. I. 398, Johnson v. McLean
57 Wis. 258.
If the question in this case were res integra, we would not be inclined
to hold that 'the figures on a check are not a material part thereof or
that an alteration of them is not forgery.
It is usual to express the amount of a check in figures as well as
in words, but a check is good tho the amount is expressed in figures only,
(Strickland v. Holbrooke, 75 Cal. 268) and this is true altho the figures
are placed in the margin and not in the body of the note. It is also held
that the figures may be used where the words of the instrument are ambiguous or obscure (Corgan v. Frew, 339 Ill. 31) or to indicate (Clute v.
Small, 17 Wend 238) (where the marginal figures were $334, and the
body three hundred-dollars) or supply (Witty v. Ins. Co., 123 Ind. 411,
8 L. R. A. 365, where the body of the note was for "- dollars") an
omission, and that where the amount for which a blank check may be
filled is restricted by figures placed on the check it is a material alteration
to tear off the figures and raise the amount or to alter the figures and
raise the amount. 7 Cyc. 595, Com. v. Pioso, 17 Sup. 45, contra Johnson
v. McLean supra. Schryver v. Hawkes, 226 S. 308. Furthermore
we have discovered no case which holds that where in a suit between
drawer and payee, there was evidence that a mistake had been made in
writing the amount in words, the figures might not be used as corroborative evidence. In view of all this we are not disposed to hold that the
figures are not a part of a check.
The doctrine that the test of the materiality of an alteration is the
legal effect of the alteration and not whether some person may be deceived by the alteration does not appeal to us strongly. The expression
"to the prejudice of another man's right," as used in the definition of
forgery, may apply as well to the party deceived, or intended to be deceived, by the instrument as to the party whose name is forged or whose
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written instrument is altered. As to the latter, no doubt the writing
must import his legal liability in some way and an alteration to constitute a forgery must change that liability. But as to the former, if the
instrument is made or altered with the intention of deceiving him, the
act seems to come clearly within the definition. Authority for this
proposition may be found in those cases in which instruments have been
held to be the subjects of forgery, altho such instruments, if genuine,
would not have created legal liability on the part of the signers. 1 L. R.
A. N. S.730.
Influenced, perhaps, by these considerations the Supreme Court of
Kentucky has held that the alteration of the figures in a check constitutes forgery, C. v. Hide, 94 Ky. 517, and the Kentucky case was cited
with'approval in Lawless v. S., 114 Wis. 189.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has expressed its disapproval
of the doctrine that the figures on a bill, note or check, do not constitute a part of the bill, etc., and that, therefore to alter them is not forgery,
and has said, "In a very important sense the figures on a note or bill
note or check are part of it."
The authorities adverse to the decision of the learned court below
are not numerous or cogent, and the opinion expressed by the court of
Pennsylvania as well as the other considerations herein set forth justify
us in affirming the opinion of the learned court below.
Judgment affirmed.
HENRY STEVICK v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK
Cashier's Check-Postal Regulation-Delivery to Payee-Forgery
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Yeager bought from defendant bank a cashier's check for $1000,
payable to Henry Stevick of Newville, Pennsylvania, and he sent this
check to Stevick by mail. Another man living in Newville by the same
name, in calling for his mail, received the letter containing the check
from the post-office clerk. He subsequently presented it for payment,
and received the money, endorsing his own name upon the check. The
plaintiff, who is the payee, upon hearing this, demanded payment from
the bank. In refusing to pay he brings this suit for recovery of the ($1000)
one thousand dollars.
Saul for Plaintiff.
Van Blarcom for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
RICKLES, J. The fact in this case give rise to three questions,
viz: Did the present plaintiff have such a possession and ownership
in the letter as will enable him to maintain this action against the bank
in his own right, or must he first bring his action against his debtor,
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and let the debtor have recourse against the bank, (inferring that the
person making the check was a debtor of the plaintiff).
The second question is: Provided the present plaintiff may bring
this action, was the endorsement a forgery?
Thirdly: If a forgery, is the bank liable?
As regards the first question, letters written by one person to another,
are the latters property, and he has a right to have them delivered to
him. Dock v. Dock, 180 Pa. 14. When does he obtain the property?
Upon delivery to him, or upon the mailing of the letter by the sender?
It is a well settled principle, that the acceptance of an offer dates
from the time of the mailing of the acceptance, "when acceptance is made
by mail," and not from the time of delivery. Gott. v. Densmare, 111
Mass. 45. 9 Cyc. 264.
It is as equally well settled that the delivery of a parcel to a carrier, the carrier becomes the agent of the consignee, or the person to
whom the parcel is addressed; and it is the property of the latter from
the time of delivery to the latter. 7 Richinson Law Review, 88. Garbrachf v. Com. 96 Pa. 449; Com. v. Flaring, 130 Pa. 138.
Following the rule in contracts, that the contents of a letter, belongs
to the person to whom addressed from the time of mailing, "meaning
by the contents, the words written upon it, surely the rest of the letter
is also his; the sender, until very recently, not having the power to recall
the letter.
Since the recent postal regulations, there has been no case adjudicated,
stating that the power of the recall of the letter, carries with it the
possession of the letter until delivery. But we are of the opinion that
should the case arise, the interpretation would be-that the possession remains in the sender until delivery to the mailee.
It may be argued that the regulation gives to the sender, but the
privilege of recalling his letter, without changing the position of the
mailee to it, but should the sender at any time elect his privilege of recalling the letter, he would be given possession of it. If being quite
clear that he has such dominion over it, until delivery, as virtually
amounts to a possession, he could not have bad any title to the letter
until delivery to him; and it was never delivered.
Therefore, the present plaintiff cannot maintain this action against
the bank, but must look to his debtor for recovery.
It may be said in regards to the question of whether or not it is a
forgery to sign ones own name, under the circumstances of this case,
that it is a forgery. The person who obtained the money having the
intent to commit a forgery. Graves v. American Exchange Bank, 17
N. Y. 203.
The liability of a bank, where it pays to the wrong person, is so
well settled, that it needs no citation of authorities to uphold it.
Judgment for Defendant.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The bank was liable to Stevick, the payee of the check, because the
check was a cashier's check which had been sufficiently delivered to
Stevick.
The deposit of the check in the mail, with the intent that it should
be transmitted to Stevick in the usual way, was in legal contemplation,
a delivery of the check to Stevick. Ogden on Neg. Instruments, 51.
The postal regulation, which provides that any letter may be recalled or
recovered by the sender before it is delivered to the person to whom it
is addressed, has not changed the rule that a deposit of a check, etc.,
in the mail is a delivery to the-payee. Canterbury v. Bank (Wis.), 30

L. R. A., 845.
The bank is not excused from liability to Stevick for the amount
of the check by reason of the fact that it paid the amount of the check
to another Stevick who lived in the same town. It is difficult to understand upon what principle it could be contended that a man should have
his money or valuable rights taken from him because he has the misfortune, thru no fault of his own, to have the same name as another person
in the same town. It is difficult to understand how the true owner of a
check may lose his property right therein by reason of the fact that it
has fallen into the hands of another person of the same name, and that
other person has forged an endorsement of his name to the instrument
and obtained the money. Fortunately the authorities are to the contrary.
Thomas v. Bank (Miss.), 58 So. 478. Beattie v. Bank, 174 Ill., 571, 43
L. R. A. 654.
Judgment Reversed.
COMMONWEALTH v. ENO
Larceny-Accessory After the Fact-Receiving Stolen Goods Under Act
of March 31, 1860

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Eno, in order to remove incriminating evidence of a larceny by
Roderick, buried the stolen goods. He is indicted as accessory after the
fact to the larceny.
OPINION OF THE LOWER COURT
WESTOVER, J. The question to be determined in this case is
whether or not Eno, under the foregoing facts, can be indicted as an accessory after the fact to the larceny.
If Eno received the goods from Roderick, with his consent and with
knowledge that they had been stolen, he could have been indicted for the
substantive crime of receiving stolen goods under Act of Mar. 31, 1860.

P. L. 410.
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At common law to buy or receive stolen goods, did not make the
receiver accessory after the fact. Possibly the Commonwealth may
now proceed against him, either as an accessory after the fact, or under
the Act of Mar. 31, 1860. P. L. 410.
It seems .that a person guilty of receiving stolen goods may be indicted as an accessory after the fact, but a conviction under either indictment will be a bar to the other. Sect. 110, Act of Mar. 31, 1860.
The court in Com. v. O'Neill, 10 Dist. 227, so held. O'Neill was indicted in Lancaster county for receiving stolen goods. The goods had
been stolen in Lancaster Co., but the act of receiving took place in Philadelphia county. The question was one of jurisdiction. The court held
that the defendant could not be indicted in Lancaster county for the
receiving of the stolen goods, but the court said that under the evidence,
if the defendant had been indicted as accessory after the fact, he might
have been prosecuted and convicted in Lancaster county.
The facts are not clear as to how Eno secured possession of the
stolen goods, but we hold that if the facts warrant an indictment for
receiving stolen goods, he could be ifidicted as an accessory after the
fact, at the option of the Commonwealth.
It is not clear as to how Eno secured possession of the stolen goods.
We think it may be assumed that he came into possession of the goods
in some other manner than a theft of them from the original thief, Roderick. Considering the intent with which Eno buried the goods, we think he
can be indicted as an accessory after the fact, although he could not be
indicted for receiving stolen goods.
There are many definitions as to just what acts make a person an accessory after the fact. An accessory after the fact is one who, knowing
a felony to have been committed, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists
the felon.
Three conditions must unite to render one an accessory after the
fact: First, the felony must be completed; 2nd, the accessory must have
knowledge that the principal committed the felony; 3rd the accessory
must harbor or assist the principal felon. 1 E. and Am. Cyc. of Laws

266.*
In this case the felony was complete. Eno had knowledge that Roderick committed the felony. The question is whether or not he has assisted the felon in such a manner as to become an accessory after the
fact. There is no set of rules as to what acts xvill constitute a person an
accessory after the fact. The cases reported are those arising when the
accessory has helped th6 felon to escape by giving him money to escape,
keeping him in hiding, giving him a horse to escape, etc., some personal
act. But we believe that any assistance rendered the felon that hin-

ders, delays, or prevents justice, would be good ground for an indictment against the party giving the assistance. Can we say that the
burying of the stolen goods so as to prevent their production at the trial
for proof of the crime is not suclh assistance as to make a person, who

buried the goods, an accessory?

It may be very material to have the
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goods produced at the trial and the non-production of them may aid the
accused to escape sentence and of great assistance to the accused.
The party who hides the stolen goods, with the intention of rendering aid
to the accused, is just as guilty as one who hides the accused. The
motives in each case are the same, differing only in the nature of the
assistance.
In 24 Texas 616, the court held defendant an accessory because he
had induced the two principal witnesses to testify falsely to the end that
the principal might be acquitted.
In Loyd v. State, 42 Ga. 221, the court said: "We hold that both
at common law and under our statute the law contemplates some assistence or act done to the felon himself. But it is otherwise when such
receipt is for the purpose of facilitating the escape from justice of the
principal felon, or is attended with some benefit to him.
From 79 Iowa 460, it may be infered that the court would hold a person as an accessory who aids in the disposition of stolen property, if
the party knew the goods had been stolen.
Eno hid these goods with the intention of aiding Roderick, and although the nature of the assisting is not directly connected with the
person of Roderick, it is such an act as may be of great assistance to
him, and is within the general rule.
The indictment is sustained.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The first question to be considered is, does the act of Eno make him
an accessory to Roderick, after the fact. "A person" says Wharton, 1
Crim. Law (10th edit.) p. 258, "who, when knowing a felony to have
been committed by another, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the
felon, whether he be a principal or an accessory before the fact, is an
accessory after the fact, involved in the same penalty as the principal."
Russell, 1 Crimes p. 64, quotes from 1 Hale 619: "If A has lis goods
stolen by B, and C, knowing they were stolen, receives them, this simply of itself makes not an accessory; but if B came to C and delivered
the goods to keep for him, C, knowing that they were stolen and that B
stole them, or, if C receive the goods to facilitate the escape of B, or if
C knowingly receives them upon agreement to furnish B supplies out of
them, and accordingly supplies him, this makes C an accessory." The
motive of Eno was to remove incriminating evidence of the larceny,
and so to shield Roderick from conviction. The learned court below
has well decided that Eno's act coupled with this object, made him an
accessory. Wharton, Crim. Law (10th Edit.) p. 854.
It seems indeed to be assumed by McPherson, J., in Common. v.
Laudermilch, 1 Dist. 460, and by Landis, J.. in Common. v. O'Neill, 10
Dist. 227, that the receiving of stolen goods, without the intention to
aid the thief to escape from punishment makes the receiver an accessory
to the thief, and the legislature appears to have made a similar assumption in the 110th section of the Act of March 31st, 1860, 1 Stewart,
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Purdon, 1006. Much more is a receiving an accession to the theft,
when it is done with the intention to aid the thief in escaping conviction.
The difficulty in the case, if any there be, is produced by the fact
that the buying or receiving of stolen goods is made an independent
felony, the punishment of which is similar to that of the larceny of the
goods. Sect. 109, Act of March 31st, 1860, 1 Stewart, Purdon, p. 1006.
In making the receiving or buying an independent felony, did the legislature nevertheless intend that it should also be capable of prosecution
as an accessoryship? We should a priori have thought not. Why should
precisely the same act constitute two crimes, for either of which the
district attorney should have the option to prosecute?
At common law, abortion, resulting in the death of the gravid woman,
was homicide, either manslaughter or murder, according to circumstances. 1 Wharton, Crim. Law (10 Edit.) pp. 347, 396, 427. The 87th
section of the act of March 31st, 1860, 1 Stewart, Purdon, p. 900, separates it from other homicides, pronounces it a felony, and prescribes a
fine of not more than $500 and an imprisonment for not longer than 7
years. It has been assumed that by this legislation, fatal abortion ceased
to be capable of being treated as a homicide, and the important inference
was drawn that dying declarations of the deceased woman are not receivable, in the trial for the abortion. Railing v. Commonwealth, 110
Pa. 100; Commonwealth v. Bruce, 41 Leg. Int. 242. The reasoning in
the former of these cases shows that a prosecution of the abortionist
for murder or manslaughter could *not be sustained. The abortion, in
short, has ceased to be classifiable and punishable as homicide, by being enacted into a special offense.
It has been assumed, however, by experienced judges, by Landis, J.,
and apparently by McPherson, J., that the crime of receiving, etc., may
still be treated as an accession to the crime of larceny, and punished
as such. Common. v. O'Neill; Common. v. Laudermilch, supra. More
important still, is the indication of the legislative understanding and
will, found in the 110th section of the Act of March 31st, 1860, 1 Stewart's
Purd., p. 1006, which provides that buyers and receivers of stolen goods
may be prosecuted and punished before as well as after the principal
felon, i. e., the thief "which prosecution, conviction and sentence of said
receivers shall exempt them from being prosecuted as accessories after
the fact, in case the principal felon shall be afterwards convicted." This
clearly implies that if the receiver has not been tried and convicted for
the receiving, he may be tried and convicted for the accessorship.
Judgment affirmed.
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GEIZER v. ZINN
Agency-Revocability-Damages
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Zinn, owning a house, authorized Geizer to find him a purchaser for
a sum not less than $10,000, and promised to pay Geizer 5 per cent. of
the purchase money. Geizer's agency was to last six months, unless revoked by a ten days notice. Five months elapsed and no proposing purchaser had been discovered by Geizer. Zinn, however, found one to
whom he contracted to convey the house for $11,000. Geizer had interested several buyers and had expended $110, in travel and other matters
pertaining to the selling of the property. Zinn declined to pay anything to Geizer, who sues for $550, and $110.
Glauser for Plaintiff.
Kalb for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
MARTIN, J. Plaintiff bases his action upon a breach of contract,
but in his statement of facts he has not averred that the required ten
days notice was not given. Without the averment of this fact plaintiff's
statement does not show a breach of contract or a cause of action. However, since the argument of both plaintiff and defendant is based upon
the assumption that the necessary ten days notice was not given, we
will assume for the purpose of the argument that the defendant failed
to give notice.
The principal point to be decided in this case is whether the defendant had a right to revoke the contract. In determining this question
a careful distinction must be drawn between a power to revoke and a
'ight to revoke. Although the principal may have the undoubted power,
as far as the agency is executory, to revoke the agent's authority, it by
no means follows that he has always a right to do sb, since the contract
of agency may provide otherwise. 31 Cyc. 1300.
We will consider first: Did defendant have power to revoke? Save in
exceptional cases,, a principal has power to revoke the authority of his
agent at his pleasure, with or without reason. The principal may revoke the agency even where it is expressed to be sole and exclusive, or,
in the absence of any consideration for the stipulation, where the power
of attorney expressly stipulates that ft shall continue for a definite term,
or that it is irrevocable. 31 Cyc. 1294. This general rule is subject to
these three exceptions: Where an authority or power is given for a
valuable consideration, it cannot be revoked by act of the principal
alone, in the absence of a stipulation that it shall be revocable. An
authority cannot be revoked by act of the principal alone, in the absence of a stipulation of revocability, where it constitutes part of a security for the payment of money or the performance of some other obligation, or is necessary to give effect to such a security. Authority cou-
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pled with interest in subject matter of agency. In the case of a power
of attorney coupled with an interest in the subject matter thereof, in the
absence of a stipulation that the power may be revoked, it is from its
nature irrevocable by the act of the principal without the agent's consent.
whether so expressed or not. 331 Cyc. 1296, Blackstone v. Buttermore,
53 Pa. 266. McMahan v. Burns, 216 Pa. 448. Hartley and Minor's Appeal, 216 Pa. 212. Yerkes' Appeal, 99 Pa. 401.: This case is not within one of these exceptions, hence the general rule applies, and defendant
had the power to revoke.
The next question, and the one on which this case hinges, is whether
defendant had a right to revoke the contract. Here we must look to
the terms of the contract. They provide that ten days notice shall be
given. This we assume was not given before revocation, hence according to the terms of the contract the defendant could not revoke without
being liable in damages to plaintiff. If principal revokes the agency
in violation of the contract, he becomes liable to the agent for the damages caused thereby. 3' Cyc. 1300. McMahan v. Burns, 216 Pa. 448.
This raises the question of the measure of damages for such a breach.
According to the following cases: Clendenon v. Pancoast, 75 Pa.
213; Clapp v. Hughes, 1 Phila. 382; Langstreth v. Long, 6 Phila. 179;
a principal, having employed an agent to sell real estate, may notwithstanding, negotiate and sell it himself, and if he does so without any
agency on the part of the broker he is not liable to him for commissions.
To earn his commission, the broker must be an efficient agent in or to
the procuring of the contract. These authorities are plainly applicable
to this case. The plaintiff was in no matter instrumental in procuring
the purchaser or in the sale of the house.
In view of the facts in this case and authorities cited it is the judgment of this court that it was clearly within the power of defendant to
revoke the contract without liability to plaintiff for commission stipulated in contract. However, it is also clearly shown that defendant had
no right to revoke the contract without giving the ten days notice as
provided in the agreement. For this breach of contract on the part of
defendant, the plaintiff should have damages. According to Jackel v.
Caldwell, 156 Pa. 266, an agent employed to sell land, whose authority
has been revoked, may recover from his principal, upon a quantum
mernit, the expenditures which he has been encouraged to make in effecting the sale, and compensation for his labor and time.
It is for the jury to estimate the amount of damages, from the circumstances of the case.
Judgment for Plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The only compensation for which the plaintiff stipulated was 5

per cent. of the $10,000 which he should obtain from a purchaser of the
land. He knew that if he failed to sell the land he would not be entitled to anything from Zinn. His expenditure of $110 was made for
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the chance of earning $500, and not on account of Zinn. Had the agency
been allowed to continue throughout the six months, and had Geizer
failed to make a sale, he would have had no shadow of claim for reimbursement for his expenses.
That the agency was revocable is clear. Revocation of the contract
was made permissible at any time after ten days from the day of notification of the intention to revoke. The harm that Geizer has suffered
therefore, is in not having the ten days after the actual revocation in
which to continue his efforts to discover a purchaser. The damages he
has suffered then, by the breach of contract, are the value of the chance
of earning $500 in the ten days, by effecting a sale. What would men
have paid for this chance? Was it worth $25 or 50? We have no appreciable assistance in coming to a decision.
The learned court below has abandoned the value of this chance as
the measure of damages, and has adopted the expenses incurred, and possibly the value of the labor performed. If the expenses could be won
back, so logically, should be received a compensation for the labor performed. Kelly v. Marshall, 172 Pa. 396. Authority for the view taken
by the learned trial judge, is found in the case which he cites. Jaekel
v. Caldwell, 156 Pa. 266.
The theory by which recovery of the expenses and reward for the
labor are justified, is, according to Agnew, J., this: "The power itself
was a request to do so, and a revocation, would leave the principal liable
to him on his implied assumpsit." Blackstone v. Buttermore, 53 Pa.
206. Zinn actually contracts to give $500 to Geizer, if the latter sells
the land for $10,000 within six months. He impliedly contracts that if
he does not allow the agency to continue through the six months, by a
revocation not preceded by a ten days notice, he will repay to Geizer
his outlays and pay him a fair reward for his work. This latter contract
it is evident, is a wholly fictitious one. The invention of it may be tolerated, because it becomes the instrument of doing approximate justice.
In the actual case, it probably does more than justice to Geizer and
less than justice to Zinn. The probability that the former would have
succeeded in 10 days more in obtaining a purchaser had notice of the
revocation been given, would hardly bring, if offered for sale $110, in
view of the fact that five months had elapsed without success, and the
utmost he had been able to do was to "interest" "several buyers," and
that nothing indicates any likelihood that in 10 more days, an actual
buyer would have been obtained.
Since it would be difficult to appraise the chance of finding in 10
days a purchaser, the measure of damages adopted by the court may
perhaps be tolerated. The defendant has himself caused the difficulty
by his non-observance of the agreement to give a ten days' notice.
Affirmed.
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HOLMES v. McCULLOUGH

Bill in Equity for Specific Performance of a Contract to Convey Land
Contract-Acceptance-Depositing Letter in Post Office-Right to Reclaim--Specific Performance

STATEMENT OF FACTS
McCullough wrote to Holmes offering him $10,000, for his home.
Holmes decided to accept and dictated a letter to that effect. The acceptance was signed and sealed and stamped by Holmes. It was taken
from his desk by his,stenographer and mailed. Holmes then changed
his mind and, learning that the letter had been mailed, telephoned to
the postmaster to hold the letter and the latter did so. Holmes recovered
the letter and destroyed it.
McCullough files this bill and proves the contents of the letter by
the aforesaid stenographer.
Durkin for Plaintiff.
Cohen for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT
McCALL, J. The Courts of Equity of Pennsylvania have power to
compel specific performance of a contract to convey land. Bispham on
Equity, 364 and cases therein cited.
The facts show that the offer was written and the answer of the defendant was placed in the mail. All authorities agree that, under the
circumstances, this was the proper manner for the defendant to act if
he desired to accept the contract.
Counsel oi argument agree that the mailing of the letter was within
the scope of the stenographer's duty, and that she was competent to
testify to the contents of the letter.
There is only one question in the case and that is :-Did the defendant accept the offer?
The regulations of the United States post-office permit a sender of
a letter to recover it from the mail at any time until it has been delivered
to the addressee. The postmaster has the responsibility of identifying
the sender. There can be no question then but what the letter in question
was lawfully withdrawn from the mail. 9 Cyc. 297.
It is well settled by the authorities on the point of accepting a contract by mail or correspondence that :--"The act of acceptance which
completes a contract takes place when the answer containing the assent
is sent properly addressed, whether by messenger or mail or telegram.
It does not depend upon delivery of the answer to the one who made
the offer and it completes the contract though a delivery never takes
place." Cosgrove v. Woodward, 49 Sup. 228; Boy v. Peanut Co., 25 Sup.
199; 7 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 2d Ed. 134; Ins. Co. v. Grant, 41
L. T. 298, 4 Mews Eng. C. L. Dig. 11; Bank v. McDonald, 174, U. S.
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610; Tayloe v. Ins. Co., 50 U. S. 390; Vassar v. Camp, 11 N. Y. 441;
Averill v. Hedge, 12 Conn. 424; Hamilton v. Ins. Co., 5 Pa. 339; Oil
Co. v. Collier, 4 Dill (U. S.) 431 -"Trevor v. Wood. 36 N. Y. 307; Barney v. Clark, 22 Psbg. L. J. (Pa.) 695; Harris' case, 41 L. J. Ch. 621;
L. R. 7 Ch. 587; 4 Mew's E. C. L. Dig. 14; Potter v. Sander, 6 Hare 1;
Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. ahd Adl. 681m; Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. (N. Y.)
103.
In Trevor v. Wood, Supra, p.'309, it wNas said: "The sending of
a letter, accepting the proposition, is regarded as an acceptance because it
is an overt act clearly manifesting the intention of the party sending it
to close with the offer of whom it is sent, and thus marking that "aggregatio mentium" which is necessary to consummate a contract."
Dwight, C., in Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y., 362, p. 365, (Plaintiff, an actress, had put a letter in the defendant's letter box as was customary,
and he never received it) said: "This is immaterial." The minds of
the parties met when the plaintiff complied with the usual, or even the
accustomed practice, and left the acceptance in a place of deposit recognized as such by the defendant. In Bauer v. Shaw, 168 Mass. 198, it was
held: If an offer is accepted by telegraph before a telegram revoking
it has been sent, acceptance being received before revocation of the offer is
received, offer is outstanding when accepted and there is a complete contract. See Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S.411. The leading case on this
point in the United States is Mactier v. Frith, Supra, in which it is
said: "An acceptance is the distinct act of one party to the contract
as much as the offer is to the other, the knowledge by the party making
the offer of the determination of the party receiving it is not an ingredient of an acceptance. It is not compounded of an assent by one party
to terms offered and a knowledge of that assent by another."
Another reason why the acceptance binds the parties 'when the letter
is mailed is one of convenience apparently and as set forth in Adams v.
Lindsell, Supra, "That if a bargain could not be closed by letter before
the answer was received, no contract could be completed through the
medium of the post-office; that if one party was not bound by his offer
when it was accepted (that is at time letter is deposited in the mail)
then other party ought not to be bound until after they had received a
notification that the answer had been received and assented to and that
it might go on "ad infinitum." In the Oil Co. v. Collins, supra, it was
held that when a contract is negotiated by telegraph the overt act which
is necessary to consummate the acceptance is placing of the telegram in
the office for dispatch. In Wood v. Callaghan, 61 Mich. 402, a letter
deposited in a street mailing box forming a part of mail delivery system in a city was held to be a delivery or mailing at post-office therein.
In McClay v. Harvey it appeared that the defendant had stipulated
that the plaintiff should reply to his offer by return mail, if she desired
to enter into a contract. The plaintiff wrote a card and gave it to a boy
to mail. The boy mailed the letter two days later, it was held that the
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offer had lapsed. The failure of the boy to mail the letter was imputed
to his master, plaintiff. The case does not decide that the post-office is
the agent of the addressee of a letter.
In White v. Corlies, 46 N. Y. 467, it was held: "Where an offer
is made by one party to another when they are not together the
acceptance of it by that other must be manifested by some overt act.
It does not need that the acceptance shall come to the knowledge of the
one making the offer before he shall be bound. A mental determination
not indicated by speech or put in course of communication by act to the
other, is not an acceptance which will bind the other."
The foregoing cases seem to explode the theory advanced by some
that the post-office is the agent of the addressee and that a delivery to
the post-office is a delivery to the addressee. The principal that they all
seem to be governed by is, that the minds of the parties meet upon a distinct proposition, manifested by an overt act.
A contract may be defined to be an agreement entered into between
two or more competent persons, whereby in consideration of a promise
of something done or to be done by party or parties on one side, the
party or parties on the other promise to do or omit to do some act.
There can be no doubt but what there was an agreement, but was it
manifested by an overt act? In Barney v. Clark, supra, White, J., held:
that when a contract is accepted by mailing a letter properly addressed,
though it never reaches its destination, having been lost in the mail, that
a binding contract arises.
The decree should then be given as prayed for unless the post-office
regulation has changed the law. We are not without authority that it
has. It appeared in Ex Parte Cote, L. H., 9 Ch. 27, 8 Mews E. C. L.
Dig., 1618, that a banker at Lyons posted a letter containing bills of
exchange to D in London, but before departure of the mail he received
a telegram from D telling him to remit nothing. The banker sent to the
post-office to reclaim his letter, which by regulation of the French. postoffice he was entitled to do on complying with certain formalities. By
mistake the formalities were not observed and the letter was forwarded
to its destination. In the meantime D had filed a petition for liquidation
-HELD-that the property in the bills did not pass to the trustee. This
case does not decide that the banker did not have the intention to mail
the package to D. The case decides property rights which do not conflict with the case at bar if I should decide to sustain the bill. Suppose
the property in the letter which McCullough wrote did not pass to Holmes,
nevertheless he placed his acceptance in writing (within the statute of
frauds) and his acceptance was evidenced by a sufficient overt act; Oil
Co. v. Collins, supra.
The letter was properly addressed and stamped and sealed. It
was not necessary that a delivery of the letter be made to the offeror or
his agent to make the acceptance complete as in case of a deed. It was
a simple contract and was placed in writing and thus was admissible in
evidence according to the statute of frauds. And since the paper on which
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it was written was destroyed it was clearly competent to prove its contents
by parole. Had McCullough allowed the letter to be transmitted to
Holmes the latter would have been bound. Therefore McCullough must
have renounced the contract by the withdrawal of his letter from the
post-office. The remedy of Holmes then was an action for its breach
and his only adequate remedy is a bill in Equity for specific performance
and decree is entered accordingly.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
When a contract has been formed, neither party to it can retreat
from it, without the consent of the other. The questions before us, are,
was a contract made between Holmes and McCullough, and if so,
when?
McCullough initiated the negotiation. He wrote and sent by mail
an offer to Holmes of $10,000, for the house of the latter. Had he not
sent this letter by mail, the dispatch by mail, of an acceptance, would
not have bound McCullough. By using the mail, however, he impliedly
signified his expectation that the answer would be sent by mail. Did
he intimate that he would be bound by an acceptance as soon as it was
dropped in the post-office? When he used the post, he did not intend
that the dropping of the letter in the office, should be the offer. This offer
was only in process of formation, until his letter was actually delivered
and read by Holmes. When he signified his expectation that Holmes
would use the same vehicle, why did he agree that Holmes' dropping the
letter in the office, should be anything more than the iuception of the
process of acceptance, which would not be complete until it ended in
the actual reception of the letter's contents by his mind?
The formation of the will to convey the house, for the $10,000, while
an element of acceptance, was not acceptance. Otherwise, why write
a letter, asserting it? Why mail the letter? The contemplated object
of writing, is to send the letter and of sending it is to inform the addressee. As the offeree must be informed, or there is no consummate
offer why must the offerer also not be informed, in order that there may
be a consummate acceptance?
If simply forming the purpose to sell the house is the acceptance
anything indicative of the existence of that purpose, should be enough
to close the contract. Holmes might have said to a friend, I have decided
to sell my house to McCullough, agreeably to his offer. This would make
the contract. He might begin to vacate the house, or have a deed made
for it, in consequence of his subjective assent to the offer. This also
would complete the contract. It has not been understood that a contract
could be thus formed. Felthouge v. Bindley, 11 C. B. N. S., 869; McClay
v. Harvey, 90 Ill., 525.
Some act must be done by Holmes, having capacity to lodge and
designed to lodge the information in McCullough's mind, of his purpose.
But when that act is complex, a series of momenta, it is arbitrary to
say that it is the beginning, and not the end of the series, that is to
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constitute the acceptance. If a process of communication is necessary
at all, why is not the consummated communication?
But if the acceptance may be said to have happened at the end of
a stage of the process, what stage shall be selected? Had Holmes written his letter and started in an electric car to deliver it in person, would
we say that as soon as he started with it, i. e. as soon as the letter began to
move towards the addressee, the acceptance was complete? Suppose,
instead of going himself, he had employed his son or other agent to
carry it, and this son or agent had taken ten steps towards the home of
McCullough, would the acceptance have become entire? In both these
cases, the process of communication would have been susceptible of interruption. Holmes, as carrier, might have stopped midway, upon his
journey. The son or agent might have been arrested by a recall.
This possibility of recall would we think, have prevented the act
from fastening on McCullough the obligation to pay-the $10,000, or on
Holmes the ;bligation to make the conveyance. Not surely until, so far
as Holmes was concerned, the completion of the transmission to McCullough became incapable of prevention, would these obligations have
arisen.
It is sometimes said that by using the post-office for the transmission of his offer, the offerer makes it his agent for the transmission
of the acceptance. The post-office was already the agent of the offeree,
if he chose to use it. The consent to its use by the offerer was not necessary. If using the mail makes it the offerer's agent, to transmit the offer, using it to carry the acceptance, makes it the agent
of the accepting offeree. All that can be meant by the assertion is,
that by sending through the mail the offer, the offerer consents that he
shall be bound by an acceptance, as soon as it is deposited in the office
for transmission. But, what warrant is there for this assertion? It
is purely gratuitous. To be sure, after'the courts have decreed that
such an act is an assent in advance, to be bound by the offeree's assent to the offer, as soon as that assent is pit in the office, such offerers
as know of this decree know that when they so use the mail, they constructively agree to be bound by answers as soon as despatched by mail.
But by an intention deducible from the court's decree, the court's decree cannot be justified in so far as it assumes the pre-existence of this
intention.
Prior to the decision ot courts announcing an intention to put a certain interpretation on the offerer's act of using the post-office, there is
absolutely no warrant for assuming that the offerer intended to make
the post-office his agent for the bringing back of the offerer's answer,
and therefore intended to be concluded by the offerer's acceptance, as
soon as it should be deposited in the mail.
The post-office has not agreed to become by carrying A's letter to
B, A's agent for the carrying back of B's response to A. If it becomes
A's agent, when it receives his letter, it becomes B's agent when it re-
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ceives B's reply. If A can recall his letter, before it is carried from the
office where it is deposited, so can B recall his. The.evidence before
us shows that B's power to recall is recognized by the Postal Department. This letter was actually surrendered to him. If we are to invent the principle that A has agreed to be bound by the commission to
the post-office of B's answer, we think the modification must be conceded
that A thus agrees to be bound, only when that commission has become
irrevocable. If A thus only becomes bound, B likewise becomes bound
only when he has lost control over the transmission of his reply.
The able opinion of the learned court below cites many cases which
hold that the acceptance occurs when the notification is put into the postoffice, and consequently, the contract then being consummate, the offerer
and the offeree are bound from that time. The offerer's failure to get
the notice, or to get it in due time, does not interfere with the completion
of the obligation. In these cases the effect of the power of the sender
of the acceptance to arrest it and prevent its delivery to the addressee
is not considered.
In Trevor v. Wood, 36 N. Y., 307, is found a paragraph to the effect
that: "The sending of a letter, accepting a proposition, is regarded as
an acceptance, because it is an overt act clearly manifesting the intention of the party sending it to close with the offer of the person to whom
it is sent, and thus marking that "aggregatio mentium" which is necessary to consummate a contract." On this it may be remarked that the
word "aggregatio" does not appear in classical Latin dictionaries, and
that the use of the word rests on stupid ignorance of the etymology of
the word "agreement," which being French of origin, has no relation
either to "grex" or to "mens." If the expression means a joining of
minds, its suggestion that such concurrence is necessary to the formation
of a contract is misleading. It is well settled that although the proposer
changes his mind and actually despatches notice of his change of mind,
an acceptance of the offer before knowledge of the change makes a contract, despite the fact that, at the moment of acceptance the mind of the
acceptor and that of the offerer are not "joined." A present mind of one
is "joined," if at all, to a past and vanished mind of the other. The
agreement does not need to be of the actual mind of the offerer with the
actual mind of the acceptor. It is enough if what is his apparent mind
agrees with the actual mind of the acceptor.
Wood v. Trevor, says that the sending of the letter is regarded as
an acceptance because it is an overt act clearly manifesting the intention
of the party, to close with the offer. It is quite clear that this is ?iol
the reason. Other acts than messages by letter or telegram, may as
clearly manifest this intention, but they are not acceptances. The remark of the justice igfnores the important fact that the letter is designed
to reach the offerer and to reveal to him the assenting mind of the offeree.
The letter must not only be written-and if written, it would clearly
manifest the intention, etc.-it must be put in the post-office. But that
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is not enough. It must be properly addressed, and stamped, that is,
it must be so adapted to the demands of the post-office department, that
it will, barring unusual accidents, actually reach the proposer. To these
conditions we think it practical to add another, viz. :-that the letter
shall have gone beyond the power of its sender, after reconsideration,
to arrest it. When it has thus passed beyond the control of the offeree,
he is bound by the acceptance, as is also the offerer.
Those who maintain that the mere deposit of the accepting letter
binds the contract, must concede that the contract may be formed without the immediate and indeed, without any, knowledge of the proposer.
They cannot therefore object to the criterion proposed, on the ground
that a contract will be formed, without the knowledge of the offerer.
Differing as we do from the conclusion reached by the learned discussion of the court below, we must sustain the appeal, and direct the
dismissal of the bill.
Decree reversed, with direction to the court below to dismiss the bill.
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JUDGE GRANTED EMINENT DOMAIN
Continued from May Number
We have considered whether the damages which the courts
permit the surface owner to recover are really adequate. But it
is when we begin to consider the obstacles that the decisions
throw in his way and which he must overcome before he can
recover anything, that we begin to realize the mockery of justice
involved in refusing him specific relief in equity. It was first
held in Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, that if the pillar robbing
which was the immediate cause of the collapse of the plaintiff's
house and lot had been done beneath the adjoining lots instead of
directly beneath the plaintiff's lot, then the plaintiff could collect no damages at all for the destruction of his house. Though
the subsidence is vertical, the support that is withdrawn is described as "lateral" and the measure of damages is limited to
what the loss would have been if the lot had been unimproved.
The result of this rule is that whenever the surface owned by
by the plaintiff is less than the extent of the mining operations,
he has the burden of showing that there was mining within the
statutory period directly beneath his lot and that this mining
was the cause of the subsidence. Generally the mining extends
under many different surface tracts and one subsidence will often
carry many properties down. It is obvious that the difficulty' of
showing just which pillar or rib it was, the removal of which
caused the subsidence, is little short of an impossibility. The
doctrine that the coal operator is immune from liability for injury
to improvements of any kind unless the tort is proven to have
been committed directly beneath the plaintiff's lot, has been
reaffirmed in two cases: Neaterly's v. Coal & Iron Co., 201 Pa.
70 and Tischler v. Penn. Coal Co., 218 Pa. 82. The cases add
the qualification that if the mining, under the neighboring lots
was negligent, then damages may be recovered by all the neighbors for the injuries to their buildings. This sounds hopeful!
Isn't the removal of all the ribs and pillars without making any
provision for substituting other supports negligent mining? A
student of all but the recent cases would have been sure of it.
As late as 1907 Dean Trickett stated the law thus: "The taking
away of all th: support or of so much that what is left is insuffi-
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cient, without substitution of artificial props, pillars, etc., is
ipso facto negligent; (Jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429; Williams v.
Hay, 120 Pa. 485), or the caving in is conclusive proof of vegligence.. (Grumbert v. Kilgore, 4 Sadler 84). * * * Ordinary
precautions against injury are such as actually prevent injury
to the surface. * * * In causing the cave--in B. has ipso facto
not adopted ordinary precautions. Coal Co. v. Hopkins, 198
Pa. 343)." See 12 Forum 8.
It is with some surprise that (in Kellert v. Coal & Iron Co.
226 Pa. 27) one finds the Supreme Courts affirming a charge
of the court below in these words: "The removal of all the
coal sand this is the only ground of complaint, is not an improper operating or working of the mines." The surface owner
had released in advance such damages as could not be avoided
"by a working of said mines in a proper manner." The Supreme
Court held that the duty to support the surface could be absolutely disregarded and the resulting injuries to the surface owner
could not be said to be due to improper mining. How was this
judicial somersault accomplished? Let us watch it.
In the Kellert case it was held with little discussion that the
question was ruled by the case of Youghiogheny River Coal Co.
v. Bank, 211 Pa. 319, a case the logic of which is extraordinary.
Let us examine it in detail. The facts were these.
The bank had owned the coal but not the surface. It sold
the coal to the coal company and agreed to indemnify the latter
from "liability for any damage which may result to the surface
of the tracts of land overlying the coal land purchased by said
coal company from said obligors and others, or to the improvements thereon, by reason of the skilful and careful mining and taking away of the said coal." The coal company so mined the coal
that the surface subsided and it was compelled to pay damages to
the surface owner. It then sued the bank for indemnity. The
bank relied upon the decision of a suit by the same coal company
upon a similar indemnity contract, which suit had been decided
against the coal company only four years previously. (Youghiogheny River Coal Co. v. Hopkins, 198 Pa. 343.) This latter
was the case in which Justice Brown had held that the very fact
that the subsidence had occurred was conclusive that "ordinary
precautions" had not been taken, and as the agreement to in-
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demnify extended only to such damage to the surface as occurred
notwithstanding the taking of ordinary precautions, no action
could be maintained on the agreement. He cited a long line of
cases to support this conclusion and the Supreme Court all agreed
with his conclusion. He was still of the same opinion in the bank
case and so was Justice Dean. But during these four years some
changes had occurred in the personnel of the court and enough of
the justices changed their minds to enable a majority to decide
that the provision to indemnify from liability resulting from injuries due to "skillful and careful mining" included those injuries
that resulted from a removal of all the coal without any provisions for supporting the surface. Instead of distinguishing the
Hopkins case, they simply ignored it, and this is the logic by
which the decision was reached. First, the coal operator is
bound at his peril to support the surface, i. e., the plaintiff does
not have to prove negligence. Liability may arise even in cases
of skillful and careful mining. Second, the indemnity agreement
extends only to damages resulting notwithstanding careful mining. Therefor, the parties could not have intended to require a
careful effort to support the surface. They must have had in
mind some injuries for which there is no liability except upon'
proof of negligence.
The fallacy may be easily indicted by a homely illustration.
One is bound at his peril to restrain his cattle from trespassing.
I'm liable though I exercised every care in their keeping. I sell
a cow and agree to indemnify the buyer for her trespass provided
she is carefully kept, e. g., if she jumps the ordinary fence. The
new owner turns her into an unfenced field and then seeks from
me the damages he had to pay for her trespasses. I reply that he
took no precautions to prevent the tort and he replies that since
liability might have been incurred even with careful keeping,
therefor careful keeping is irrelevant.
In the bank case, in order to give some effect to the language
used, the court suggested that perhaps the coal company could
not get indemnity if they put off such an enormous blast in the
mine as to blow up the surface over the mine or do damage to it.
As well might we say that the new owner of the cow should only
be deprived of indemnity in case he actually drove her into his
neighbor's field.
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Justice Brown pointed out that the plaintiff's own statement
showed that he sought the right to indemnity against liability for
the removal of the surface support but that the agreement as executed had stricken out this provision. But the majority took the
view that there would be no advantage in the agreement to the
coal company unless it enabled them to rob the piliars with impunity. In one breath they cite many cases to show that it often
happens that the surface subsides though ordinary care is exercised to support it and that the operator may be held in these
cases, but in the next breath they say the agreement is worthless
unless it relieves the operator of the duty to take any care, except
in the use of explosives.
As the Kellert case shows, the result of this decision is to convert into absolute releases from all duty to support the surface all
those grants that expressly purport only to release the grantee
from the extraordinary liability which the law imposed for those
subsidences that happen even when due care to support the surface is exercised.
The most recent seeming perversion of a release is reported
in Stilley v. Pittsburg-Buffalo Co., 234 Pa. 492. The language
was this: "Together with free and uninterrupted right of way
into, upon and under said land at such points and in such manner
as may be proper and necessary for the purpose of digging, mining and carrying away said coal; hereby waiving all damages arising therefrom. Together with the privelege of mining and removing through said premises other coal belonging to said party of the
second part, his heirs or assigns, or which he or they or any of
them may hereafter acquire." It seems patent that this whole
paragraph deals with the right to go under or over the surface
wherever it is necessary to do so either for the removal of the
coal sold or for the removal of coal mined under other properties.
Nothing is said about the duty to support the surface, no suggestion of a waiver of this right. Yet it was held to have been
waived by the language used. This is the logic. Note that immediately preceeding the words "hereby waiving all damages arising therefrom" is the phrase defining the extent of the right of
way to be such as "may be proper and necessary for the purpose
of digging, mining and carrying away said coal." In order to
convert the release from a release of the damage to the surface
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resulting from using the right of way into a waiver of the surface support, all you have to do is to say that "damages therefrom" relate to the words "digging and mining" and since the removal of the supports is done by digging and mining, therefore
the collapse of the plaintiff's house is "damage therefrom." Moral for the surface owner's lawyer. Beware of the word "digging"
or "mining,"' for if you use these words in any connection, a release of damages may be held to relate to these far reaching
words.
Just as the Kellert decision was justified by a reference to the
Youghiogheny River Coal Co. case, so the Stilley case in turn
was rested upon the Kellert decision. Said the Court: "The
waiver of damages in *thepresent case is as broad and comprehensive as in the case just cited (the Kellert case), and a reversal in
the present case would in effect overrule that case." Therefore to
avoid admitting an error, we will now make another. Thus does
one decision lead the way for others of like character.
The doctrine of the cases just named, that the disregard of
the duty to support the surface is not to be stigmatized as "negligence" nor is such mining to be denominated "improper," is further illustrated in the case of Tischler v. Penna. Coal Co. 218 Pa.
82. The plaintiff in her statement alleged that "the defendant
negligently and carelessly so mined said coal that the support to
the surface was insufficient to maintain the same whereby the said
surface * * * * fell in, destroying said surface." We think it obvious that it was intended to charge the removal of the supports,
or the failure to properly distribute them, and to call this negligence. But the Supreme Court said: "The alleged causes of the
injury to the plaintiff's surface were not only the withdrawal of
proper supports for the surface within six years of bringing the
suit, but also the negligent mining of the coal within the same time.
If either or both of these causes were sustained by the testimony,
the plaintiff was entitled to recover:Pringle v. Vesta Coal. Co. 172 Pa. 438."
The Tischler case reaffirms the doctrines of Noonan v. Pardee. (a) That no action can be brought for subsidences if
more than six years have elapsed since the date "when the support
of the surface was so weakened that it might fall," (b) that if
the subsidence was due to mining under the adjoining lots instead
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of directly beneath her, she could get nothing for the destruction
of her home, but only "compensation for the surface in its natural
state."
The application of this doctrine that the total omission to
made any effort to support overlying land is not negligence has
been applied to the like duty of support owed by one surface
owner to an adjoining surface owner. In Freseman v. Purvis,
51 Super. 506, the court reasoned that since it had been decided
that the rule of absolute liability for removing lateral support
extended only to the land itself, the presence of a building on
the adjoining lot released the excavator from all duty to furnish
support. The court declared that the rule mentioned would be
without substance were it to be held that the act of leaving the
adjoining land without any support constitutes negligence. (See
p. 511). The doctrine of four prior supreme court decisions has
thus been stated by Dean Trickett in 12 Forum, pp. 102 and 103,
"He is under a duty in withdrawing support, to take reasonable
precautions to prevent the sliding or falling of A's land, although
that land would not have slidden or fallen but for the added
structures. And when B is thus negligent he becomes liable to
compensate A for the injury not only to the land but also to the
building and other structures upon it. * * * One must use the
usual and ordinary methods adopted in order to protect the
foundations of adjacent buildings. (7 W. 460, 174 Pa. 474,
194 Pa. 21, 204 Pa. 58)." It is obviously untrue that there is
no substantial difference between requiring a fair effort to support
and holding one bound at his peril to support.
In considering the adequacy of the remedy at law, we think
a court of equity might appropriately consider whether the law
action has been rendered easy. of prosecution or very defficult
by the decisions. To tell a surface owner that the statute begins to run as soon as the surface might fall is to compel him
to sue before he can show tangible damage. And as Mr. Ardemus Stewart has suggested, (p. 2287 of Purdon's Digest), "the
surface owner cannot tell whether sufficient supports are left
without securing expensive expert assistance, and even if he
should go to all this expense which most surface owners are
financially unable to incur, then if he should bring suit to prevent
NOTE 1. Though he recover damages, he cannot recover these
expenses as costs. 9 D. R. 218.
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the running of the statute, unless the surface had already subsided, he would be met with the plea that no actual damage had
occurred and plenty of expert evidence on the other side to the
effect that none ever would occur."
It cannot be denied that this doctrine as to the statute of
limitations is bound to cut off many a right to sue before the
surface has subsided and assuming it to be true that some damages may occasionally be gotten before a subsidence occurs,
who will say that these damages are often apt to be adequate to
repair the actual damage that is inflicted when the subsidences
occur?
In the late case of Welsh v. Kerr Coal Co., 233 Pa. 341 a
landslide was caused by adding unduly to the lateral pressure
upon the plaintiff's land by building a culm bank and tramway
on the hillside above the plaintiff's property. Justice Stewart
stated that the rule applicable to such a case is that "where one
takes the risk of injuring others to save trouble or expense to
himself in the use and enjoyment of his property, he makes himself liable for any loss he may inflict on his neighbor." It would
seem that this is exactly the position of a coal company that deliberately removes the support of the surface owned and occupied
by another and to save expense refrains from providing artificial
supports. Yet the surface owner gets little redress in a law
court and none in a court of equity.
Can this situation be explained? We think it can. We
believe the same considerations control the court now that lead
the court to the ultimate decision of the Sanderson case, involving as it did, a disregard of fundamental rights guaranteed by
the constitution. The coal company craved immunity in that
case on the ground of the importance of the coal industry and
that stream pollution was both customary and necessary. Justice Gordon's reply on behalf of the Supreme Court in 94 Pa. at
page 308, is notable: "It is utged that mining cannot be carried on without this outflow of acidulous water, hence, of necessity, the neighboring streams must be polluted. This is true;
and it is also true that coal mining would come to nothing without roads on which to transport the coal after it is mined; therefore, roads are necessary; but it does not follow that, for such
purpose, the land of an adjacent owner may be taken, or his.right
of way encumbered, without compensation."
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"If, indeed, the custom set up were to prevail, then at least
so far as coal mining companies are concerned, there would be
an abrogation of the 8th section, art. 14 of the Constitution,
which provides that "municipal and other corporations invested
with the privilege of taking private property for public use,
shall make just compensation for property taken, injured or destroyed by the construction and enlargement of their works,
highways or improvements. Not only would we thus have a
custom superior to the supreme law of the land, but one reaching
even beyond the possible sovereignty of the state, in that, it would
empower private persons, for private PurPoses, to injure or destroy
private property and that without compensation." Yet, on the fourth
appeal, by a majority of one vote, the court reversed its three
earlier decisions in the same case and did just that. This changing of the law was so abrupt that it did attract attention. The
rights of surface owners to have their land supported are being
over-thrown by a series of decisions that we think should not
escape attention.
Shortly after the decision of the Supreme Court in Noonan
v. Pardee, Lindley published his treatise on mines. In Sec. 823
by a collection of quotations from the opinion of Dean, J., he
exhibits the different inconsistent doctrines of that decision.
He then adds this observation, "It is fair to infer that a conclusion beset by so many difficulties would hardly have been adopted
by the court in the absence of what were deemed controlling considerations of public policy and expediency." A student of the decisions since Noonan v. Pardee is continually impressed with the
truth of this observation. In the face of stich "controlling considerations" we need not be surprised to find a disregard of precedents, of reason, or of property rights.
JOSEPH P. McKEEHAN.
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MOOT COURT
COOL v. PAYNE
Equity-Iniunction-Private Letters-Property Right of Writer and of
Receiver-Publicatioti-Transfer
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cool, a college student. wrote a letter to Payne, a friend of his, describing the college and setting forth his ambitions for the future.
Five years later Cool became one of the most famous men in the
United States because of his inventions and discoveries. Payne advertised Cool's letter for sale.
Cool asks for an injunction restraining the publication or sale of the
letter.
Means for Plaintiff.
Price for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GLAUSER, J.-The injunction prayed for by the plaintiff in the
case at bar, depends upon whether or not he, the plaintiff and writer of
the letter, had a sufficient property right in the letter to maintain this
action. The question as to the writer's property right in a letter is
much mooted, and the law very unsettled at the present time; but, upon
consideration of the modern English cases and the cases throughout the
United States generally, the tendency seems to be to give the property
right in the letter to the writer.
The recipient of a letter ha a qualified property in the paper on
which the letter is written. He may keep or destroy it, and he may recover possession of it when lost, but he cannot publish it or communicate
it to others without the consent of the writer. 25 Cyc. 1493; 142 Fed. 827;
32 Fed. 437.
In Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Duer. (N. Y.) 379, the question was considered
exhaustively, and all the earlier cases were reviewed. The conclusion
was reached that the writer of even private letters of no literary value,
has such a proprietary interest as required a court of equity at his instance to prohibit their publication by the receiver.
In Barrett v. Fish, 72 Vt. 18, it was said "that a court of equity will
protect the right of property in such private letters, by enjoining their
unauthorized publications." This same doctrine has been held, either
expressly or by way of dictum in the courts of many other States.
In Dock v. Dock 180 Pa. 14, the leading Pennsylvania case, Justice
Mitchel held: "In the letters written by, the plaintiff to her son, she
has a special property to prevent their publication or communication to
others, or use for an illegal purpose. The special right in these letters
is one that can only be protected in equity.
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In view of the cases cited the rule seems to be well settled in Pennsylvania as well as in other States, that the publication of private
letters, whether on private matters of business, literary topics or family
affairs, if attempted without the authority of the writer, may be enjoined.
Taking the view that Payne merely wished to sell the letter for its
value as an autograph letter of a famous person, and not for publication,
the courts seem to favor the idea that its mere transfer could not be
enjoined. The precise inquiry is whether indifferent letters written by
one at the time perhaps little known or quite unknown which subsequently
acquire value as holographic manuscripts, may be marketed as such.
This case does not involve personal feelings or whist has been termed
the right of privacy. The thing which has value as an autograph is not
the intactable thought, but the material substance upon which a particular
human hand has been placed and has traced the intelligible symbols.
Perhaps the autographic value of letters may fluctuate in accordance with
their length or the nature of their subject-matter. But whatever such
value may be, in its essence it does not attach to the intellectual but material part of the letter.
This view is very well brought out in a recent Mass. case-Baker v.
Libbie, et al, 210 Mass. 599 (1912) in which Ruggs, C. J., said: "But on
principle it seems to flow from the nature of the right transferred by the
author to the receiver and of that retained by the writer in ordinary
correspondence, that the extent of the latter's proprietary power is to
make or to restrain a publication, but not to prevent a transfer. The
rule applicable to the facts of this case, as we conceive it to be, is that
in the absence of some special limitation imposed either by the subject
matter of the letter or the circumstances under which it is sent, the right
in the receiver of an ordinary is one of unqualified title in the material
on which it is written. He can deal with it as absolute owner, subject
only to the proprietary right retained by the author for himself and his
representatives, to the publication or non-publication of idea in its particular verbal expression."
In view of the authorities cited we believe the law in Pennsylvania
to be that the publication of the letter should be enjoined; but not the
transfer. There is nothing in our law to indicate that the Mass., 6, decision the most recent on this subject, would not be followed.
Decree accordingly.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The existence, extent and character of the rights of the writer of private letters upon indifferent subjects not possessing the qualities of
literature, and the degree of protection to be given in equity to such rights
as are found to exist, have been the subject of judicial determination in
the courts of England and this country for almost two hundred years.
The inquiry has been rendered more difficult and the decisions more
obscure, by the fact that courts of equity, following a time-honored but
mischievous formula, have insisted that no relief should be given save in
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the protection of property rights, See 51. L. R. A. 360 note, and in order
that relief might, in some cases, be given to the writer, have been required
The recipient has a
to recognize a dual property right in the letters.
property right in the letters which entitles him to the physical possession
thereof, and to destroy the letters if he chooses. See 25 Cyc. 1493; 51 L. R.
A. 360; 25 A & E Ann. Cas. 555. The writer of the letters has a property
right in them. The nature and extent of this rather fanciful property right
is the question in this case.
From the tangled skein of decisions the learned court below claims
to have extracted the principles (1) that the only right which the writer of a
letter has a right to restrain its publication by the recipient and (2) that
in applying this rule the term publication must be understood as meaning
making public thru printing or multiplication of copies.
The opinion of the learned court below finds emphatic support in
Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, from which he has quoted extensively, and
in Labouchere v. Hess, 77 L. T. Rep. N. S. 559, where it is held that the
injunction granted should run against publication and not against "informing any person of their contents," and in a monograph in 59 L. R. A. 360,
where it is said that the recipient has the right of transfer.
It is also doubtless true that in a majority of cases which have come
before the courts the act which was complained of and enjoined, was the
publication of the letters by the multiplication of copies. Nevertheless we
are not persuaded that the recipient of a letter has an unqualified right of
transfer and we beleive that equity should in a case like the present enjoin
such transfer.
In Rice v. Williams, 32 Fed. 437, it is held that the receiver of private
letters has not such an interest therein that he can sell them without the
writer's consent. See 25 Cyc. 1493 n. In Eyre v. Higbee, 22 How. Prac.
198, it was adjudged that letters in regard to business or friendship altho
they pass to an administrator or executor of the receiver are not assets in
their hands and cannot be made the subject of sale or assignment by them.
In 25 Cyc. 1493, it is said, "The recipient has a qualified property in the
paper on which the letter is written * * * but he cannot publish or communicate it to others without the writers consent. Finally, in Dock v.
Dock, 180 Pa. 14, it is held that the writer of.letters has a special property to prevent their publication or communication to others; or use for any
illegal purpose by the party wrongfully in possession of them,and that this
right "is one which can only be adequately protected in equity."
From these authorities it sufficiently appears that the courts have determined that the writer has something more than a mere right to prevent
the multiplication of copies. Even if it were admitted that the only right of
the author was to restrain "a publication," the conclusion to which the
learned court below has come would not necessarily follow. The term
"publication" has not always been given the narrow definition given it by
the learned court below. In Widdemer v. Hubbard, 19 Phila. 263, in which
an injunction against the publication of private letters was sought, a "publication" was defined as "a making known to others of the contents of the

262

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

letter," and in Dennis v. Leclerc, 1 Martin (La) 297,an injunction against
"publication" was held to have been violated by one who has shown the
letter to others.
It appears therefor, that there are authorities which specially hold
that the receiver of a letter does not have the right of transfer, and that
there are other authorities which hold that he has no right to communicate
its contents to others. The sale or transfer of a letter almost necessarily
results in its contents being made known to others, and the latter authorities are, therefor, authorities against the right of transfer.
The authorities cited justify us in granting the injunction asked for in
this case. Upon principle we are fully satisfied that it should be granted.
No good reason is discovered why the receiver of letters should have the
right to use them as articles of commerce, and injury, the damages for
which cannot be adequately estimated, is likely to result from such use.
In the case of letters possessing no literary value, we are unable to
distinguish the injury done to the writer by the multiplication of copies,
from that done to the writer by the communication of the contents of the
letters to others in any other manner e. g. by transfer.
The injunction should have been granted.
The decree is reversed.

WILLIAM HARRIS v. JOHN JAMISON
Vendor and Vendee-Bond-Consideration
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jamison bought a home for $1800, giving a bond for the price, payable
20 years after date. He took possession and has ever since retained it.
The bond has just become payable and the annual interest on it has been
promptly paid. Jamison has discovered that Harris' title was defective;
but if he is allowed by the true owner to continue the occupation of the
home for another year he will acquire a perfect title. He seeks to defeat
a recovery on the bond.
McCann for Plaintiff.
Means for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
RENARD, J.-In order to make a bond obligatory it is not necessary
that a consideration appear the seal itself being evidence therefor; Cosgrove v. Cummings, 195 Pa. 497; Grutt v. Willis, 11 S.& R. 106; and every
bond from the solemnity of the instrument is said to carry with it an internal evidence of good consideration which wil be sufficient to support the
agreement; Holdridge v. Allen, 2 Root (Conn.) 139; Page v. Trufait, 2
Mass. 159: In Cosgrove v. Cummings, 195 Pa. 497 it was held that a seal
imports a consideration and creates a legal obligation, but in an action
upon a bond or note under seal, want of consideration is no defence. But
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in a case of failure of a consideration, as where it proves to be a mere nullity the agreement will not be binding; Fulton v. Hood, 34 Pa. 365. If the
contract between the vendor and the vendee calls for the conveyance of
an interest in the real property contracted fora failure of title to such
realty is a failure of consideration; 39 Cyc 1212; but if the contract is
merely for vendor's interest in property the purchaser takes the risk of the
existence of such interest. Thus the vendor of a tract of land cannot recover on a note given in payment therefor, or on any other promise to pay,
where he had no title to the land, this being a failure of consideration;
Stone v. Fowle, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 166; Rice v. Goddard, 14 Pick. (Mass.)
293; and in Smith v. Wood, 12 Wis. 425 ,a bond without consideration,
altho under seal could not be enforced.
In the absence of an express provision indicating the character of the
sale of real property the implication is that a good or marketable title
in fee simple is intended in all executory contracts, and as a rule the purchaser is under no obligation to accept a defective title. And a title which
exposes the vendee to litigation is not marketable; Swayne v. Lynn, 67 Pa.
436; Dearth v. Williamson, 2 S. & R. 498. In most jurisdictions, however,
the implied warranty of title which exists when the contract of sale is executory is held not to exist when the contract has been executed by delivery and acceptance of the deed of conveyance but in such a case the vendor is liable in absence of fraud or mistake, only on the covenants contained
in the deed, it being assumed that if the purchaser desires to protect himself from a defective title he will have proper covenants inserted in the
deed, and if he does not. as where he accepts a quit-claim deed, the doctrine of CAVEAT EMPTOR applies both at law and in equity, and he is
without a remedy; Earle v. Dewitt, 6 Allen 520; Kimball v. West, 15 Wallace 377. This rule does not apply, however, to the full extent in Pennsylvania and Texas.
In Pennslyvania the doctrine is that if the consideration money has not
been paid, the purchaser may defend in an action therefor by showing
that the title was defective, either in whole or in part, whether the vendor
has executed a deed of conveyance or not, and whether in case he has
done so, there are covenants in the deed concerning title, unless it plainly
appears that he (the purchaser) has agreed to run the risk of the title:
Steinhauser v. Witman, I S. & R. 438; Ludwick v. Hunzinger, 5 W. & S.
51; Cross v. Noble, 67 Pa. 74. By the way of dictum in Crawford v. Murphy, 22 Pa. 84, the court said: "But to resist such payment he (vendee)
must show that the title is absolutely bad by proving a superior indisputable title to the land in a third person who is asserting his right thereto
by virtue of such title." This we do not however, think is the law as
very little authority is found upon this specific point and as a matter of
practical application it would be a very difficult task on the part of vendee to show a superior title when there only exists a small defect which
renders the property unmarketable.
According to the rules laid down in Parker v. Crane, 6 Wendall 64;
Smith v. Webster, 2 Watts 478; and in Hotaling v. Hotaling, 23 Barb. 498,
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the possession of lands under a contract for sale is an adequate consideration to support a promise to pay the price thereof, and hence if a purchaser takes possession of the property sold, he cannot retain possession
under the contract and refuse to pay the purchase price,unless his occupancy has ripened into an adveise possession altho the title of the vendor
is defective. But in the present case there is nothing which warrants us in
saying that the vendee proposes to retain possession of the property and
evade payment on the bond, on the contrary, he proposes to wait another
year, put off paying the debt for that time to determine whether or not
he can procure a good title by adverse possession. On the other hand a
vendor of real property is not entitled to recover the purchase price or
any portion thereof which is due until he has fully performed on his part
all the acts which by the terms of the contract are conditions precedent
to such rights: 39 Cyc. 1905, and surely the passing of a good title is a
condition precedent to the receiving of the purchase price.
So far we have practically discussed the rights arising under the contract of sale, we will now discuss more fully the rights arising out of the
bond. Where the action is not on the contract for the sale of land, but is
on a separate and independent promise by the purchaser to pay the vendor
the sum specified at a particular day, before the defendant can defeat action
entirely he must show either fraud in the transaction in which the note
or bond had. its inception or an entire want or failure of consideration.
At common law the general rule is that defendant cannot show a want
of or a failure of consideration as a bar to an action on a bond, but in
some jurisdictions failure of consideration may be shown; Anderson v.
Best, 176 Pa. 498. The rule as laid down in 176 Pa. 498, is that want
of consideration is not a defense to a bond executed and delivered, but
failure of consideration, however is because it raises an equity for relief
which will be enforced in Pennsylvania even in a court of law. And
in Garrett v. Crosson, 32 Pa. 373, on.an action on a purchase money note,
where the purchaser held under bond for good title and there were encumbrances on the land greater than the whole of the purchase money, it
was held that, on failure to make a good title, the vendee had a right to
treat the contract as rescinded, and the consideration of the note as wholly gone. In view of the above decisions and doing justice where justic should be done, we enter judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
It would not be right to compel Jameson to pay $1800 for a lot, of
which within a year, he may be deprived by the ejectment of the owner
of the superior title. At the end of the year, if he shall have been
allowed to remain in possession, his title will become invulnerable.
It will then be fair for him to pay the price what he has agreed to pay.
The proper solution of the difficulty is we think, to condition the right
of the plaintiff upon the perfectionment of the title within the year
either by the abstinence of the owner from suit, or the purchase of his
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title, by Harris, and the transfer of it to Jameson. Cf. Jackson v.
Knight, 4 W. & S. 412; Roland v. Miller, 3 W. & S. 390.
Let judgment be entered for the plaintiff for $1800, with stay of
execution until this perfection of the title.
JEREMIAH CRABB v. JOSEPH CROFT
Landlord and Tenant-Defects in Leased Premises at Time of LeasingLiability for Injuries to Tenant's Servant
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Croft owned a lot on which was a tavern. Behind the tavern was a
deep well, the cover of which was slight and unsafe. He let the premises to X, who employed son of plaintiff, a lad of 14 years of age, as a servant. This son was sent into the yard in the evening to do some work
.and stepping on the cover of the well, was precipitated into it and was
drowned. This is an action by the father for the loss of his son.
Haberstroh for plaintiff.
Cunningham for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
KEARNEY, J. It is to be observed that this is not an action between landlord and tenant but between landlord and stranger to the
lease. It involves the question of the liability of the landlord to the servant
of his tenant, for an injury caused by defective condition of private
property.
The liabilities of a landlord may be classed under the following
classes:
First, where the owner leaves the premises on which there is a nuisance,
or must in the nature of things become so by their use, then whether in
or out of premises he is liable for injuries resulting from such nuisances,
Knause v. Bend, 107 Pa. 85; Ford v. Roberts, 108 Pa. 498, also Wunder
v. McLean, 134 Pa. 334.
Second, where the premises are let for rent or profit to be used for
purposes for which they are not fit or safe, and all this was known, or
should have been known to the lessor, he is also liable for injuries resulting from such use. Godley v. Hagerty, 20 Pa. 387; Barker v. McFerran, 26 Pa. 211; Stenberg v. Wilcox, 96 Tenn. 163; 34 L. R. A. 615,
Third where the property at the time of the demise is not a nuisance,
and the injury happens by some act of the tenant, or while he has entire
controll of the premises, the owner is not liable.
If landlord is liable it is upon one or either of two grounds, either
for his negligence, or for creating a nuisance.
Was the landlord guilty of negligence? The facts state the cover
was slight and unsafe and that the well was deep. It was in this condition when let. The word slight is defined, as: not stout, slender, slim,
as a slight framework, etc. This suggests that the cover was of thin
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boards or other material insufficient in thickness. This also imputes
carelessness and negligence to the landlord who constructed, or permitted
such a covering for a deep well, a part of the premises he was about to
rent, knowing that it was dangerous to those who would have occasion
to use it. Under the circumstances it is fair to charge that he knew it.
Defendant's counsel admits this. It does not necessarily follow that
the tenant knew it. The surface of the cover may have presented a
strong appearance and the edges may not have been open to vision.
There was no covenant to repair,and in such case the tenant must make
ordinary repairs, Tiffany.
The following cases are somewhat on point, and were decided on the
ground of negligence in construction, and the premises let without any
stipulations to repair by either. Cases where the landlord knew, or should
have known of defective condition of premises when let, not known to
lessee.
In Godley v. Hagerty, 20 Pa. 387, A erected on his premises for rent,
a building, and permitted it to be so loosely constructed that in consequence thereof during its occupancy in the manner originally expected
and within the limits of its supposed capacity and capability, the building suddenly fell and injured a laborer who was employed by lessee. The
laborer was not guilty of negligence. Lessor was held liable.
In Stenberg v. Wilcox, 96 Tenn. 163; 34 L. R. A. 615, "A landlord
is liable to a boarderon the premises leased for a boarding house, for injuries sustained by reason of unsafe and dangerous back porch, which was
known or might have been known by the exercise of reasonable care and
diligence, by the landlord at time of letting."
In 8 Ill. App. 217, the defect alleged was in the manner of hanging
a chandelier. It was hung unsafely. The lessor knew it but did not
disclose it to the lessee. It was not apparent to an observer. Held, that
lessor was liable to the servant of lessee, who was injured by its fall,
citing also Cowen v. Gunderland, 145 Mass. 363.
In cases of hidden defects known to lessor and not known to lessee,
or not discoverable by reasonably careful inspection, the landlord is
liable to the tenant, including members of his family, infants, and minors,
and others lawfully upon the premises. Moore v. Parker 53 L. R. A.
778; Cooke v. Gutkese, 80 Ky. 598; Minor v. Shoran, 112 Mass. 477;
Cesar v. Karntz, 60 N. Y. 229; Cowen v. Gunderland. 145 Mass. 363;
Tiffany on Real Property 103, also Booth v. Merriman, 155 Mass. 521;
Kern v. Myll, 80 Mchg. 135; Martin v. Richards, 155 Mass. 381.
Had the lessee also knowledge of the defects, would this absolve the
landlord from his responsibility to strangers to the lease?
In cases where there was a duty on landlord to the public to repair
and he let premises with defects, it is generally held that he is liable,
tho a tenant is in possession. Kuchner v. Smith, 207 Mass. 431, where
a nurse fell thru a hole in the sidewalk, Reading City v. Reeves, 167 Pa.
41; McNerney v. Reading City, 150 Pa. 611; Bears v. Ambler, 9 Pa. 193;
Mintzer v. Trustees of Hogg, 192 Pa. 137.
In cases where landlord owes no such duty to the public, the cases
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are much in conflict, the modern tendancy seems to extend liabilities of
landlords in these cases, as where he owes a duty to the public and as
in cases of nuisances, Godley v. Hagerty, supra., Barker v. McFerran,
26 Pa. 211; Sword v. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28; Springer v. Ford, 189 111.
430; 52 L. R. A. 930; Shoninger Co. v. Rdw. Mann, 3 L. R. A. 930.
Both landlord and tenant may be guilty for same injury, the landlord for negligent construction, and tenant for negligent use of the
dangerous premises, 2 H. Blackstone.
In Sword v. Edgar, supra., it was held, "The person injuriously affected in this case, a laborer, by ruinous state of premises, demised has
no right of privity in the coveant. He is not given thereby an action
against lessee greater or more secure than he had before. He has the
right without the covenant to repair. The covenant is a means by
which the lessor may reimburse himself, for any damages in which he
is cast by reason of his liability. But it is an act and obligation between himself and another which does not remove or suspend that
liability."
In view of above reasons stated plaintiff is entitled to judgment.
Judgment for Plaintiff.

OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
When a lease of a building is made, there is no implied assurance
from the lessor to the lessee that the premises are fit for occupancy,
are adapted to the purposes for which the lessee is leasing them, or even
can be safely used. It is for the lessee to examine them and determine
whether he wishes them in the condition in which they are. It does not
appear explicitly whether the lessee, in this case, examined the premises or not. He must be treated as if he did examine them. The nature
of the defect does not suggest concealment of it. So far as the evidence
discloses, the tenant had the same means of discovering the defect as the
landlord. How long he was in possession before the accident is not revealed. If for a month or two, he must have noticed, we must suppose,
the well and the nature of the cover over it.
There is no rule of law of which we are aware, that an owner of
land shall not let it, unless it is in a perfectly safe condition with respect to the persons or the property that may come, or be placed, upon it.
The tenant must be assumed to have as much wisdom and discretion
as the lessor, and his is the duty not to invite persons to the premises,
unless he finds them or makes them safe for such persons. The lessor
has a right to assume that he will not omit to adopt such precautions
as rational and benevolent persons generally would adopt, to avoid
injury to human beings, either by repairs and alterations, when such are
required, or by refraining from calling upon the premises persons who
may be injured, if the repairs and alterations are not made.
"As regards defects existing at the time of the demise" says Tiffany, 1 Landlord & Tenant, 649, "the general rule is that the landlord,
whether the original lessor or his transferee. is not liable for injuries to
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the person or property of any person who may thereafter be on the premises. He has a perfect right to lease premises in a tumbledown or otherwise dangerous condition, if any person cares to take a lease of them, and,
as he incurs no liability to the tenant, by so doing, so he can incur no
liability to persons who go on the premises merely in right of the tenant.
Otherwise the tenant by inviting persons on the premises, could impose
liabilities on the landlord to an indefinite extent."
An exception is mentioned; that of a lease of premises for a "public
or quasi public purpose, such as a wharf or pier, or a public hall," etc.
One who leases premises for such a purpose, has been held liable to
,those who entering the wharf, theatre, hall, for business or pleasure, are
injured therein by reason of defects known to the lessor to exist when
the lease is made. Tiffany, 1 Land. & Ten. 655. Whether a tavern
would be considered devoted to a "public or quasi public purpose" has
possibly not been discussed. The lad who was drowned, was not on
the premises as guest, but as a member of the family, as a servant. There
is no reason for extending a lessor's liability to him, that would not ex-,
tend it in all cases of leases to members of the family of the lessee.
Godley v. Hagerty, 20 Pa. 387, is supposed to teach a contrary doctrine.
Of it, and others like it, Tiffany observes, "They are not in accord with
the current of authority to the effect that the lessor is liable for injuries,
only if they are caused by hidden defects of which the lessor knew and
which he failed to disclose" to the tenant. In the case named, the lessor
built the structure in order to let it to the tenant, to be used in a certain
mode. He knew, or was bound to know, the tenant did not know, that
the building was unfit for the proposed use. In making the proposed use
of it, the building collapsed, injuring workmen and property. The lessor
-was held liable.
The case of Bailey v. Kelly, 122 Pac. 1027 (86 Kan. 911) it must be
allowed, fully supports the decision of the learned court below. The
case is sharply criticised by the annotator. It runs counter to a very
considerable stream of decisions, many of which are cited by Tiffany
in the learned work from which we have quoted. We think it unwise
to incorporate the doctrine of it into the law of Pennsylvania.
It is well to note that what we are deciding has naught to do with
the liability of a lessor, for the results of defects upon other premises,
or upon persons who are on other premises than those which are the
subject of the lease. The question before us is, is the landlord liable
for injuries occurring on the premises, to persons who are there by the
causation of the tenant, in consequence of defects in the premises which
existed at the time of the making of the lease, but of whose existence the
tenant had knowledge before he invited such persons on the premises. We
see no reason for requiring the owner to abstain from letting his house,
until he spends money in changing it, if the lessee knows what its condition is, and is willing to accept a lease of it as it is. When such a tenant takes possession, he, not the landlord, is to determine what persons
shall be invited upon it, and the character of the persons thus invited by
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him will determine the care or negligence of thus inviting them or of not
apprising them, when invited, of the risks that they will run, if they
enter within the premises. A landlord does not impliedly invite to the
premises all whom the tenant invites, nor is he to be made responsible
for the omission of the tenant to give the information necessary to protect from injury, those who accept the invitation.
It is with some regret that we are constrained to reach a conclusion
different from that which the court below has so skilfully and learnedly
defended.
Reversed.

STEPHEN v. HARRIS
Sale of Foodstuff-Implied Warranty-Damages-Trespass-Act
May 4, 1889
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Harris a grocer, sold a ham to Stephens. The eating of the ham
caused severe sickness to Stephens who sued for damages. There was
no express warranty that the ham was wholesome but Harris knew it
was bought in order to be eaten. Harris had bought the hams of X
from whom for years he has bought hams, which heretofore had never
been complained of as unwholesome.
OPINION OF THE COURT
RENN, J. In the case before us, the question is raised as to the liability of a vendor to a vendee for the sale of certain food stuff which
caused sickness to the vendee. The doctrine that an implied warranty
accompanies the sale of provisions was laid down by Blackstone in 3 Bl.
Com. 165. This doctrine was later repudiated in England and in the
United States by the courts holding that on a contract for sale of provisions there is nothing to be inferred which may not be inferred to a like
purpose in other cases. Emerson v. Bigelow, 10 Mass. 197. In the sale
of personal property there are implied warranties that the thing sold
exists and is capable of being transferred; that the vendor has a valid
title and will deliver the exact quantity, but it has been held that in the
absence of fraud there is no warranty of quality, and the buyer takes at
his risk. Am. 8 Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 15 page 1218.
In Lerkens v. Freund, 27 Kan. 664, the Court held that where food
is sold for domestic consumption there is an implied warranty that it is
good and wholesome. Several other States of the union have held the
doctrine of an implied warranty accompanying sale of food stuffs but
such doctrines are in direct contradiction to the common law principle
of caveat emptor. excepting where statutes provide otherwise. In Pennsylvania the legislature decided to enact more stringent measures for the protection of health of the people and provided by Act of May 4, 1889, that,
"In every sale of green, salted, pickled or smoked meats, lard and other
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articles of merchandise used wholly or in part for food ...... unless the
parties shall otherwise agree, there shall be an implied contract or undertaking that the goods or merchandise are sound and fit for household
consumption."
The subject matter in question is distinctly recited in the above act
and surely the act is in point in this case.
No penalty is fixed for the violation of the act but we find in 35 Cy.
441-3 that "a breach of warranty express or implied affords a valid ground
for action against the seller for damages." The action in this case is
trespass and we hold that the action is a correct one and the plaintiff
can recover damages in trespass on the implied warranty as recited in
Act of May 4, 1889.
In support of the above statement we cite Erie City Iron Works v.
Barber, 106 Pa. 125, where it is held that "An implied warranty is neither
more or less than a contract and the remedies for its breach are the same
as for breach of an express waranty. That there may be recovery in an
action in the nature of deceit does not change the character of the
foundation to recover. Formerly it was common to sue in this form where
the claims were on contracts of warranty and such remedy is not obsolete in this state. The plaintiff may choose either case or assumpsit."
Since the action of trespass on the case has been absorbed by the action
of trespass in Pennsylvania, we therefore hold trespass a suitable
action in this case.
In Trebohn v. Genkins-The Forum, Vol. 12 Page 122, the Supreme
Court said: "Had there been any absolute duty on the part of vendor
to refrain from selling diseased hams * * * the damage would properly
embrace compensation for the sickness arising from the consumption
of the hams. Such a result of eating them is not too remote, too unlikely, to require the vendor to anticipate it as a consequence." No one can
deny but that the act imposed an absolute duty on the part of the vendor
to refrain from selling diseased hams, and consequently the damages
sustained by Stephens should be estimated in a manner as suggested in
Trebohn v. Genkins, supra.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
Three questions are presented for determination: (1) Where there
is a sale of foodstuff for immediate consumption, is there an implied warranty that it is wholesome; (2) if so, may damages be recovered for sickness caused by the unwholesomeness of the food; (3) if so, is trespass
the proper form of action in which to recover such damages?
(1) In England the decisions are not in accord as to whether there
is an implied warranty of wholesomeness. (See 35 Cyc. 407n). A similar conflict exists in the American authorities. The weight of authority,
however, supports the view that there is an implied warranty. 26 L. R. A.
195, 15 L. R. A. N. S. 884, 35 Cyc. 407, 15 A. & E. Encyc. 1238.
In McNaughton v. Joy, 1 W. N. C. 470, it was held that "in case of
goods for table consumption there was always an implied warranty that
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they were fit for the purpose for which they were sold," and the rule set
forth in this case was given legislative sanction by the act of 1889.
The propritey of a rule which makes a dealer an insurer of the
wholesomeness of the food which he sells for immediate consumption
may well be doubted. Courts which maintain the rule urge in its support
that it is conducive "to public health and safety." In Hoover v. Peters,
18 Mich. 51, it is said, "The rule that such sales are warranted is not
only reasonable, but essential to public safety. It is safer to hold the
vendor to a strict accountability than to throw the risk on the purchaser."
It may be very trUe that the rule is "conducive to public health and
safety" but it is not entirely clear that it does not require the vendor
to do more than his share towards conducing the public health and safety.
The modem tendency of the law is against rules which impose liability
without fault and it has been held in at least one state that an act which
imposes such liability is unconstitutional. It is also a very significant
fact the Uniform Sales of Goods Act provides for no such warranty.
Because of the statute quoted in the opinion of the learned court below the first question must however, be answered in the affirmative.
(2) The second question must also be answered in the affirmative.
There is, it is true, a diversity of opinion as to whether personal injuries
due to defects warranted against are an element of damage, but it is
conceded by many well considered cases that personal injuries may be
regarded as an element of damage where such damage must have been
the natural and direct result of the breach of warranty. 35 Cyc. 478.
The present case is clearly within this principle. Moreover, the reasons
asserted for imposing the liability of an insurer upon the vendor indicate
that the damages for the breach of warranty of wholesomeness should
include as an element thereof the personal injuries resulting from the
consumption of the unwholesome food.
(3) The opinion of the learned court below sufficiently indicates that
the third question must be answered in the affirmative.
Judgment Affirmed.

JNO. MALONE v. EMANUEL STEWART
Promissory Note-Consideration-Compounding a Crime-DuressAct March 31, 1860
--STATEMENT OF FACTS

Samuel Allison by false pretences, procured a sale to himself of
goods worth five hundred dollars($500) by Malone. Malone made an information against him for the crime of fals; pretences, and said he would
"press" the prosecution unless the price of the goods was paid. Unable
himself to pay, he revealed the situation to his wife, a daughter of Stewart, who becoming frightened and distressed, appealed to her father to
give Malone a satisfactory security. Stewart then executed to Malone,
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the note on which the suit was brought, telling Malone that it was a
hard case, that he would not have made the note except to relieve his
daughter from her distress and himself and her from the disgrace of a conviction. Malone said he was sorry that the case was as it is, but he would
secure a conviction, unless the note were given. Stewart sets up these
facts as a defense.
Kearney for plaintiff.
Smith for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HABERSTROH'J. The question involved presents an interesting
object in view of the fact that the Legislative powers of Pennsylvania,
have expressly enacted a statute applicable to the present case.
By the Act of Assembly of March 31, 1860, a method was created,
whereby the settlement of misdemeanors might be affected between the
parties concerned without the proceedings of a regular court trial. The
Act provides, (1) That in all cases where a person shall on complaint of
another be bound by recognizance to appear, (2) or shall be indicted for
assault and battery "or other misdemeanor," to injury and damage of
party complaining, (3) Not charged to have been done with intent to
commit a felony, (4) or not being an infamous crime, (5) and for which
there shall also be a remedy by action, (6) if party complaining shall
appear before the magistrate who may have taken recognizance or made
commitment, or before the court in which the indictment shall be, and
acknowledge to have received satisfaction for such injury and damage;
it shall be lawful for the magistrate to discharge the appearance of defendant.
Under the present circumstances, Malone had already made information against Allison for the crime of false pretences, thereby necessitating Allison's appearing before the court and submitting to trial for
offense charged.
The act further states that in order to invoke the remedy provided
by said act, the defendant must be charged "with assault and battery or
other misdemeanor." Whether the crime of "false pretences" is to be
included within such a "phrase," is a question for us to determine.
In Commonwealth v. Carr, 28 Sup. 122, the Court in construing the
act of March, 31, 1860, advances the doctrine, that, " the crime of false
pretences belong to the class of misdemeanors, which by Sec. 9, of the act
of penal procedure of March 31, 1860, may be settled between complainant
and offender at the discretion of the examining magistrate." The same
doctrine is considered as a favorable construction of the statute and is
sanctioned and affirmed by the majority of courts' Gier v. Shade, 109
Pa. 180; Schruylkill Co. v. Cdpley. 7 Pa. C. C. 145; Williams v. Dresher,
17 Phila., 231; Sleimbaker v. Wilson, 1 Camp. 76; P. T. Digest of Decisions, Vol. 3, colg. 4115.
We are warranted in presuming that the crime committed by Allison
was not an infamous crime and not done with intention to commit a
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felony as there are no declarations to that effect advanced by the complainant or examining magistrate.
Malone also had a civil remedy against Allison, and may have sued
Allison in a tort action and secured damages; but as the facts state, that
Allison was pecuniary embarassed to extent requested, it would have been
folly to institute civil proceedings against such a one.
The appearance before the examining magistrate, to whom the information was brought of both the complainant and offender; and the
acknowledgement that satisfaction has been received for such injury; is
a vital constituent of Sec. 9, of the act of March 31, 1860.
In the present case Stewart and Malone secretly compromised as to
the settlement of the crime.
Stewart executed notes to Malone, in satisfaction of which, Malone
privately consented to withdraw the complaint of false pretences against
Allison.
The crime of false pretences is certainly an act as affects the public
and not the interests of private individuals and'any act which is made
punishable by law as a crime is an offense against the public
and especially in this country where all prosecutions are subject to the
control of official prosecutors and not the individuals immediately injured. Such a crime cannot be made the subject of private compromise
"except, so far as expressly authorized by statute; and this view is supported
by the great weight of American authority. Noble v. Publes, 13 S.& R.
319; People v. Bishop, 5 Wendell 111; Shaw v. Spooner, 9 N. H. 197;
Corley v. Williams, 1 Bailey 588, Vincent v. Groom, 1 Yerger 430.
But Pennsylvania has expressly authorized by statute, a method by
which certain crimes may be settled privately, and the crime of false pretences belongs to such class of crimes that may be settled according the
9 Sec. of Act of March 31, 1860, previously referred to.
The statute expressly declares that it is essential that complainant
and offender appear before the examining magistrate who may have taken
recognizance of such crime and that complainant shall acknowledge to
have received absolute satisfaction for injury caused by Defendent.
This essential was lacking in the compromise effected between Stewart and Malone.
Instead of appearing before the magistrate to whom the information
had been brought, Malone and Stewart secretly settled or compromised
the crime and such a compromisi was directly in opposition to the manner
of settlement declared in the statute.
Such private compromise should not be vested in individuals. It would
enable them to use the claim of the government for their own emolument
and to the oppression of the people. It has a direct tendency to obstruct
the course of the administration of justice and forces the offender to meet
the terms as presented by the complainant; of course if settlement was obtained under duress such would vitiate the contract; but once the law is
priviledged to be enforced by the individual, the ingenuity of man would
devise methods whereby their purpose could be effected and in no way
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contrary to the established principles of the law. If it were given to party
injured, who might be the only witness who could prove the offence, he
might extort for his own use money far in excess of that which would
constitute a reasonable amount in satisfaction of injury received.
To avoid such a practice by the individual, the Pennsylvania legislature in enacting the statute, declared that the compromise or settlement
could only be affected in presence of the examing magistrate who had the
recognizance of such crime.
This method of settlement was exactly what Malone and Stewart
failed to accomplish.
The Counsel for the Plaintiff raises the question of duress. Altho the
present case may be decided without recourse as to whether duress was
present or not; it might be well to briefly discuss such questions.
Stewart thru the pleadings of his daughter and to save himself from
the disgrace and dishonor of his daughter's husband serving a penal sentence, executed the note to Malone; whether such constituted duress is
the question to be answered.
It is difficult to see how the purpose of doing that which one properly
may and should do, until divested from it by some act of offender can be
said to be a duress on such party, with respect to the act by which he
affects the diversion. The decisions are however far from being harmonious; Clark on Contracts 360.
In Stouffer v. Latshaw, 2 W. 165, an arrest for a proper cause was not
duress as regards a note given to escape it.
On the other hand it has been held that if one from whom A, has
embezzled money, employs the power to prosecute for the purpose of extorting from A, a much larger sum than that which was embezzled the act
is one of duress, and money paid by A, can be recovered back. Fillman v.
Ryan, 168 Pa. 484.
We thoroughly coincide with the statement made by the counsel for
the Defendent when he says, "Courts are charged with the duty of administering the laws and they should not lend their aid to the enforcement of
any contract, which looks to its subversion." But if he were to have us
believe, when he says "that the offense charged in the present case was of
a public nature and since it deeply concerned the public, and strikes at the
very foundation of public confidence," and nothing less than a penal sentence should be meted out to Allison "we, with equal firmness urge the
contrary. The crime charged here is not of that class of crimes which
can be regarded as infamous, great or notorious. The penal sentence does
not absolutely look toward the abolition of such crime by the imposition
of a term of imprisonment; it mainly affects the individuals concerned
and in the majority of cases where one is able to settle the matter in a
pecuniary matter, such settlement in the majority of cases will have
the same effect upon the deterring of such a one or the public to repeat
the commitment of such a crime. The injury directly resulting to the
individual who is forced to serve a penal sentence for such a class of
misdemeanors works more detriment than good which the public may
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derive. Altho there are numerous authorities and opinions to the contrary, we thing we are in harmony with the majority in saying that once
a man is classed as a convict, his friends, his acquaintances, even those
who are incompetent to judge him, lose their admiration, their respect,
their degree of trust, etc., as regards his virtuous elements.
Is it then well to say that such hardship, and injury should befall
an offender when a more lenient remedy might be advanced, and which
offers the same results as obtained under the former theory?
Therefore had Malone secured a settlement in the presence of an
examining magistrate, the note executed by Stewart would have been
valid and the law would give Malone a civil remedy against Steward in
default of payment.
The facts as stated, evidence the fact that, Steward is not liable to
Malone for amount of note executed; the act, under which such a settlement is to be governed, having been openly violated and such being the
case, Malone has no legal action against Steward for amount of the
note.
Judgment accordingly.

OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The learned court below has decided that there can be no recovery
because the consideration of the note sued upon was the compounding
of a criminal prosecution.
We do not concur in this conclusion. It has been specifically held
that a note given in consideration of the abandonment of a prosecution
for false pretences and in settlement thereof is founded upon a valid consideration. Geier v. Shade, 109 Pa. 180, Sadler's Crim. Proc. 347. It is
undoubtedly true that such a settlement will not bar a subsequent prosecution for the offense unless the settlement is made in the manner
and form required by the ninth section of the act of March 31, 1860, C.
v. Carr, 28 Super. 122, but in a number of cases the civil courts have
allowed recoveries upon notes, etc., given in pursuance of such settlements, altho it did not appear that the settlement was made in the manner and form required by the act. Geier v. Shade, 109 Pa. 180.
It is quite possible that the court's distinguished cases where the
settlement is set up as a bar to a criminal prosecution from cases where
an attempt is made to enforce the terms of the settlement in the civil
courts. In the former class of cases it must appear that the provisions
of the act were complied with in the latter class of cases the method of
settlement required by the court need not have been adopted. See 9
Cyc. 507.
It is, however, unnecessrry to decide this question. To render an
agreement to compound a crime, it is essential that there should be an
agreement not to prosecute. Fountain v. Bingham, 235 Pa. 45. There
was not such an agreement in this case. It has been held that threats
of a prosecution unless a security is given do not justify the inference
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that the agreement is, that if the security is given no prosecution will
follow. Swope v. Ins. Co., 93 Pa. 231.
The question of duress should have been submitted, under proper
instructions, to the jury. Fountain v. Bingham, 235 Pa. 45.
The judgment is reversed and upon the retrial of the case, the
learned court below is instructed to submit to the jury the question of
duress.
Judgment reversed.
SOLOMON v. PLATO
Evidence-Lost Instrument-Proof of Handwriting-Act of May 12, 1895
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Suit on a note alleged to have been executed by Plato, for $1,000.
The note had been lost.
Williams testified that he had seen a note for $1,000, bearing the
name of Plato; that he remembered the features of the signature and
that they were so similar to that of certain signatures shown to him in
the court and admitted by the defendant to be genuine, that he was
convinced that the signature to the note had been written by Plato.
Objection to this evidence induced the Court to exclude it, and verdict
was for the defendant. Plaintiff moved for a new trial.
Shaeffer for Plaintiff.
Hollister for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT
EVANS, S. M., J. This is a motion for a new trial because of the
exclusion of the testimony of Williams, offered to prove the handwriting of Plato, the defendant.
Nothing has been more fluctuating than the rule of competency in
respect to evidence of handwriting by comparison. In England it is
broadly laid down that such evidence is inadmissible, tho' the rule does
not seem to be without exception even there. In some of the United States
it has no prohibitory effects at all, and in some, if not all the rest, it
exists with material qualifications. In Penna. it may be considered as
settled by Vickroy v. Shelley, 14 S. & R. 372, that the naked, unassisted comparison of handwritings is inadmixsible; but its competency
for the purposes of corroboration seems to be established in both civil
and criminal cases. Callau v. Gaylord, 3 Watts 321.
The opinion of a witness called to prove haidwriting is not admissible until his knowledge, as well as the basis thereof, is established
as a matter of preliminary proof, Slaymaker v. Wilson, 1 P. & W.
216; to the satisfaction of the court, Wilson v. Van Leer, 127 Pa. 371,
and unless his opinion is expressed with a degree of certainty, Shitler
v. Bremer, 23 Pa. 413, Fullam v. Rose, 181 Pa. 138.
Williams testified he had seen a note for $1,000, bearing the name
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of Plato; that he remembered the features of the signature; that they
were so similar to those admittedly genuine that he was convinced that
the signature to the note had been written by Plato. He never had
seen Plato write nor had any correspondence with him, he did not see
him sign this note; his knowledge, if he had any, of Plato's handwriting and the basis thereof were not established as a matter of preliminary proof and this is a prerequisite to the admission of such testimony, Slaymaker v. Wilson, 1 P. & W. 216. This is the rule when
the signature to be proved is before the witness. As to proof of handwriting a distinction exists between the proof of a lost instrument and
a paper produced under the inspection of a witness. With respect to a
lost instrument and where the knowledge of the witness has been acquired since be saw the paper, the proof of the handwriting must be of
the most unequivocal and positive kind; nothing short of actually seeing the party write; or of an acknowledgment distinctly and clearly
made by the party himself will suffice. Porter v. Wilson, 13 Pa. 641.
The plaintiff relies on the act of May 12, 1895, as a last resort, but
the act makes provision for two kinds of opinions: First, The opinion
of any person acquainted with the handwriting of the supposed writer.
Second, The opinion of those who have had special experience with, or
who pursued special studies relating to documents, handwritings and
alterations thereof, who are called experts. It is enough to say that if
Williams had any knowledge of Plato's handwriting or special experience, or pursued special studies relating to documents, it does not appear in the statement of facts and we can not see any ground for the
admission of such testimony. Were courts to admit such evidence,
then in all cases of doubt in regards to a signature, all chances of disproving the signature would be taken away by losing the instrument
and having a witness testify as in this case.
The question whether a witness has sufficient knowledge to give
his opinion as to the handwriting, is, in the first instance, a luestion
for the Court, to be determined on the preliminary facts proved, Wilson
v. Van Lees, 27 Pa. 371, and we are unable to find any errors in his
ruling in this case. The judgment of the court is therefor affirmed
and the motion for a new trial refused.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
One question arising in this case is, may one who becomes acquainted with the chirography of X, after he has seen a document purporting to be signed by X, be allowed to testify that the signature to
that document was written by X? If he had learned X's mode of writing before seeing the writing in dispute he would unquestionably be
competent. We see no reason for denying his competency when the
knowledge of the type was gained subsequently and while the memory
of the writing in dispute was still fresh and clear. In Porter v. Wilson,
13 Pa. 641, Rogers J., while holding the evidence of the authorship of a
lost paper insufficient, was unwilling to adopt the principle that "after-
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acquired knowledge in no case will enable the witness to prove a signature to a lost instrument."
Was the knowledge of the type, acquired by the witness in the case
before us, inadequate? Plainly not. It was founded on the inspection
of at least two signatures which were admitted by the defendant to
have been written by him. To have seen one signature once, may
enable a witness to know the type.
As to the authorship of the writing used as a standard, what better
method is there of knowing it, than the solemn admission of it in court
by the defendant? Had the witness seen him write; had the witness,
having corresponded with him, obtained a letter with his name
affixed, he would have sufficiently known the type. The acknowledgement of the signatures was as reliable a means of knowledge.
Porter v. Wilson, 13 Pa. 641.
We are unable to see that the degree of certitude professed by the
witness, was insufficient. He declared that "he was convinced that the
signature to the note had been written by Plato." In Hart v. Eckles,
4 Phila. 48, where proof of the signature to a lost document was held
insufficient, the witness, after saying that he believed the signature to
have been X's, added, that this was conjecture, that he had no posiThe
tive belief. In the case before us, the witness is "convinced."
confidence of the witness in Stone v. Thomas, 12 Pa. 209, was also
much inferior to that expressed in this case. Cf. Trickett, Law of
Witnesses, 633.
So far as appears, the only evidence of the genuineness of the signature to the lost note, was that of the single witness. While objective
comparison, that is of the paper whose genuineness is disputed, and of
a standard paper, is allowed, only to corroborate other evidence, comparison between the type of writing, in the mind of the witness, and
the writing in question, has never been similarly restricted. Wills,
deeds, disposing of millions of dollars' worth of property, can be proven
by the latter comparison alone. In such cases, when the document to
be established is in court, the witness compares the seen document
with the invisible standards stored in his mind. When the document is lost, both terms of the comparison are invisible. The witness
has ordinarily two memories, that of the document and that of the
type, and he compares these two remembered data. Or he may have
compared the document when it still existed, with the type, and as a
witness may remember the results of that comparison. When the
document is alleged to have been destroyed or lost, the evidence of
such loss or destruction should be clear and convincing. The nonproduction of it makes impossible the submitting of it to witnesses who
might contradict the witness who asserts its genuineness. This, howThe imposever, does not justify refusing to receive the evidence.
sibility of furnishing evidence in contradiction of a witness, does ilot
render inadmissible the testimony of that witness. Two persons
may witness what is alleged to be a murder. One of them so testifies
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as to make the act murder. The other Witness, probably, would give
the transaction a totally different cast. The death of this witness
would not make unusable the testimony of the other.
Several cases, it is true, have decided that a witness who has seen
the lost writing cannot express an opinion that it was produced by the
same person by whom writings exhibited in court are admitted to have
been produced, Putnam v. Walley, 40 Ill. 346. The contrary, and, as
we think, the better view has been taken by Cochran v. Stein (Minn.)
136 N. W. 1037. We agree with the writer of a note in the Harvard
Law Review, of 1912, p. 169, who says, "This decision, it is submitted,
takes the correct view. The witness is unable adequately to tell the
jury how the lost signature looked, without expressing his opinion that
it resembled the signature in court; and the circumstances of the case
make the evidence peculiarly essential. It is not necessary to rely
[as do Koons v. State, 36 Oh. St. 195; State v. Shinborn, 46 N. H. 407] on
the additional reason present in similar cases where the witness is an

expert."
It was error, therefore, for the trial court to reject the proffered
testimony.
Judgment reversed with v.f. d. n.

COMMONWEALTH v. REYNOLDS

Perjury-Res Adjudicata-Former Jeopardy
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Reynolds was on trial for larceny-a witness for himself he testified
to an alibi, other witnesses proved his commission of the larceny. The
jury however believed him and acquitted him. He was then indicted for
perjury, the same witnesses as in the other case testified to his guilt. He
testified as before. The court was asked to charge the jury that to try
him for perjury was to put him twice in jeopardy and that the question
of his having committed the larceny was res-adjudicata. The court declined to so charge and there was a conviction.
This is a motion for a new trial on the ground that the court
erred in declining to charge as requested by the defendant.
Parsons for plaintiff.
Morosini for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
CARROLL, J. This case resolves itself into two questions,-(l)
that to try Reynolds for perjury would be to put him twice in jeopardy,
(2) that the question of his having committed larceny was res adjudicata.
The first plea is entirely irrelevant, as the two causes of action are
entirely different. In the first trial he was acquitted of larceny, in this
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trial he is accused of an entirely different act,--perjury; this act had
nothing to do with the first act whatever. The definition of jeopardy
is as follows :-"that no person shall be subject for the same act or offense to be put twice in jeopardy of life or limb." Clark's Criminal Law
page 43L In this case it is a different and not the same offense.
The second and principle question is the effect that is to be given to
the acquittal of the appelant under the indictment for larceny for, it is perfectly clear that he cannot be guilty of perjury if he was innocent of the
larceny. Whether he was guilty or innocent of the larceny was the question decided in the first trial. In that trial he was found innocent of the
crime of larceny. Now if he is to be convicted of perjury the jury in the
case at hand must believe that he was guilty of larceny; but he was found
innocent of this in the first trial, therefore he was not guilty of falsely
swearing when he stated that he did not commit the larceny. The first
jury found him innocent of the crime charged and the second jury found
him guilty because he testified that he was not guilty of such larceny.
The first decision settles finally that he did not commit the larceny, therefore if he did not commit the larceny he could not be guilty of swearing
that he was innocent. He cannot again be put on trial where the truth
or falsity of the charge in the first indictment is the gist of the question
under investigation, as this matter is res adjudicata.
The definition of res adjudicata as found in 23 Cyc. 1215 is as follows:
"A fact or question which was actually and directly in issue in a former
suit, and was there judically passed upon and determined by a domestic
court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between
such parties or privies, in the same suit or in any other court of competent
jurisdiction, upon the same or different course of action."
Bell v. County of Allegheny, 184 Pa. 296, Bolton v. Hey, 168 Pa. 418,
hold,-"A judgment in a proper court, upon the facts contained in the
record, puts an end to all further litigation, not only as to the particular
claim then before the court, but also as to all claims on account of the
same subject matter."
The cases cited are all civil cases but we see no reason why if this
rule applies in the civil law it should not in the criminal law. There are
also cases in other States in criminal law, the majority of which hold
that he could not be tried for perjury. In support of this we cite Cooper
v. Conrad, Ky. 45 L. R. A. 216, which holds,-"Acquittal on a charge of
a criminal offense is a bar to a prosecution of the accused for perjury in
swearing that he did not commit the offense." judge Van Fleet, in his
"Treatise on the Law of Former Adjudications," page 1242 and 628 says,"If there is a contest between the State and the defendant in a criminal
case over an issue, I know of no reason why it is not res judicata in
another criminal case." 24 A. & E. Encyc. of Law, page 831, cites the
cases of W: S. v. Butler, 38 Fed. Rep. 498, Cooper v. Comm. of Ky. 45
L. R. A. 216, which hold,- "Where in a criminal procedure, it is found
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that the defendant is not guilty of the acts charged and he is acquitted,
he cannot thereafter be tried for perjury based upon testimony given by
him as a witness for himself at the trial asserting his innocence.
Now while we find no Pennsylvania cases on point in the Criminal
Law, we do find cases to substantiate our theory in the civil law and
also criminal cases in other States. Therefore seeing that all the Pennsylvania cases in the civil law recognize the doctrine of res adjudicata,
and that the great majority of criminal cases in other States hold the
same, we think the court below erred in not charging the jury that the
question of his having committed the larceny was res adjudicata.
Motion for new trial granted.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
Larceny and perjury are not the same crime. The former is a
felony, the latter a misdemeanor, although the punishment of the latter,
fine not exceeding $1500 and imprisonment for a term not longer than
7 years and disqualification to testify, is severer .than that of the former.
fine not, exceeding $500 and imprisonment three years. The ingredients
of the crimes are entirely different. Larceny is an act of taking personal
property; perjury is the act of affirming or denying something. When
a man is tried for larceny, he is not tried for perjury, and vice versa.
It hardly needs argument to convince us that subjection to a trial
for perjury, after a trial for larceny, whether it results in an acquittal
or a conviction, is not a subjection to a double jeopardy for the same offense, and that the plea of autrefois convict or autrefois acquit would
in the second trial be irrelevant. Allen v. States, 194, Fed. 664 39 L. R.
A. N. S. 385, States v. Vandemark, 77 Conn. 201, 1 Am. & Eng. Ann.
Cases 161, People v. Albers, 137 Mich. 679, 100 N. W. 908.
Reynolds was acquitted of the larceny. This verdict was produced
by the testimony of Reynolds himself that he was at another place than
that where the larceny was committed. To find him guilty of perjury
would be to find, not that he committed the larceny, nor that he was where
the theft occurred, at the time of its occurrence, but that he was not at
the other place at which he averred that he was. He might have been
at any one of a hundred or a thousand places, different both from the
place where he said he was, and the place where the theft was committed.
When the jury in the former case rendered a verdict of not guilty,
it did not really affirm the guiltlessness of the accused. A jury is often
compelled in a criminal case to make such a verdict, even if it believes
the accused guilty. When its belief is not such as to exclude any reasonable doubt, it must adjudge the prisoner not guilty. "Not guilty" then
means simply "we are not above doubt whether he is guilty."
If, in the second trial, viz that for the perjury, the jury finds the defendant guilty, it asserts that it is above doubt that he committed the
larceny and that, in denying it, he was conscious of falsehood. The
difference between the two juries is not necessarily, that one believes the
defendant innocent, and the other believes him guilty. Both may believe
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him guilty. The latter jury may simply believe his guilt more strongly,
than the earlier. There is hence no contradiction between the verdicts.
It is clear, then, that the assertion by the Commonwealth at the second trial that the accused was not where he said he was, at the first trial,
is not an assertion of his having committed the larceny, is not therefore
a contradiction of the verdict. Reynolds' testimony was not simply that
he was not at point of where the theft occurred, but that he was at point
X.
Had Reynolds testified that he was not at point Y, and that he did
not steal the articles which were there stolen, we would find ourselves
unable to agree that he could not be convicted of perjury, because the
jury which convicted him of perjury would be virtually saying that he
did commit the theft, whereas the former jury had said that he did not
commit it. It is possible that the first verdict was induced by perjury.
Why should the fact that it was rendered, preclude the State from proving that it was so produced? Adjudication may be set aside for fraud.
If setting aside of an adjudication in a criminal case, in favor of the
accused, is forbidden, notwithstanding that it was procured by his perjury must we also say that the perjury cannot be subsequently investigated not for the purpose of retrying the accused for the larceny, but for
To sustain the charge
the purpose of punishing him for the perjury?
of perjury would be to reveal to the world the fallability of jurors' inferences from evidence. That fallibility in general is already known. It
cannot be necessary to prevent the revelation of it in particular cases,
and for that reason to prevent the prosecution of the accused for the perjury by which he obtained his acquittal.
Prisoners are under a strong temptation to perjure themselves when
The
as by the modern law they are allowed, they testify for themselves.
temptation will be strengthened, if the penalties of perjury are withdrawn
from them, in case they succeed by their perjury in procuring an acquittal. Is it not an absurdity to hold, that if by perjury A effects his
exemption from punishment of crime X, he shdll, because of that exemption, also exempt himself from the punishment of the perjury which has
wrought it? The State's law against larceny is thwarted by the perjury of the accused. Therefore the State's law against perjury shall also
be thwarted!
The principle that a matter once adjudicated cannot be relitigated was
made for the benefit of the State's tribunals, and for the benefit of parties
who have gone to trouble and expense, and assumed risks, in submitting
a fact to the decision of these tribunals. But, when a man has abused
the tribunals by perjury, why should he be protected from a reinvestigation? And, if the State's tribunal has been abused by perjury, why should
either it or the State be unwilling to reinvestigate, for the purpose
either of setting aside the decision which has been procured by fraud, or
for the purpose of punishing the employment of the fraud in the procuring of it?
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The State has gone far enough in favor of the criminal or for the
ease of its courts, when it has said that he having even by perjury obtained a decision of not guilty, he shall not be retried for the same offense
even if the perjury tainting the verdict has been discovered. It is not
necessary to go still further, and to preclude the punishment of the perjury.
To prevent a conviction for a perjury which resulted in acquital,
because a conviction would be a denial of the fact found between the same
parties in an earlier proceeding, would have this result. If the perjured
testimony was successful in protecting from the punishment of the primary crime, it would ipso facto prevent the punishment of the perjury,
whereas, if the perjury was unsuccessful, the accused would be liable
for the punishment for the primary offense, and also for the secondary
offense of perjury, a result that would be scandalous and absurd.
Probably a majority of the courts have taken the view which we have
expressed. Some, however, have arrived at the conclusion which the
learned court below has ably defended. A collection of the cases may
be found in 39 L. R. A. N. S. 385, 1 Am. & Eng. Annot. Cases, 161, and
17 Am. & Eng. Annot. Cases, 753.

